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1.  Executive Summary 
Purpose and Study Objectives 
 
1.1.   The study set out to produce evidence that will help the Government of Uganda (GoU) 
and other relevant stakeholders understand (a) the challenges facing the health sector; (b) 
the obstacles that limit the efficient, effective  and timely procurement, distribution and 
usage of medicines; and (c) what reforms (or changes) are needed to improve access to 
medicines to all Ugandans. 
1.2.  The study focuses on five issues. First, the viability of the institutional partnerships 
crafted between the different stakeholders in the medicines sub-sector. Second, the issue of 
procurement and disbursement of medicines and health supplies. The study tracks the flow 
of funds for, and the supplies of the drugs/medicines with a view to determining the pattern 
of expenditure allocation, and whether all resources allocated to the medicines sub-sector 
reach their intended beneficiaries. Third, the transportation of medicines from the District 
Health  Office  (DHO)  and  Health  Sub-Districts  (HSDs)  to  the  lower  heath  centres  is 
highlighted. Fourth, the management of stocks at the facility level, the problem of drug 
stock outs, and the perception of service users based on the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) 
and  exit  interviews  covering  252  patients  are  documented.  Fifth,  the  challenges 
encountered in the acquisition, distribution and utilisation of the medicines are discussed. 
Finally, the conclusions and recommendations are presented. 
Rationale of the Study 
 
1.3.  The rationale for this study is three-dimensional. First, the dramatic rise in the health 
needs of Uganda’s population, which is growing at a rapid rate of 3.2 percent. Uganda’s 
population will rise to 32 m in 2010 and to 43.9 m by 2020. Thus, in 10 years, the health 
system must cater for an additional 12 m people. The population below 18 years of age is 
over 50 percent of the national population and has health needs that must be catered for. 
1.4.  The second concern of the study was the apparent mismatch between Uganda’s high 
health  needs  and the  small  budget  allocated  to  the  health  sector.  Public health-sector 
spending  was  US$8.2  per  capita  in  2007/2008,  which  is  equivalent  to  9.6  percent  of 
government total expenditure. In fact, health expenditure as a proportion of government’s 
discretionary expenditure has stagnated at this level (9.6 percent) since 2000/2001. This 
falls below the Abuja Declaration target of 15 percent.  Health sector funding is inadequate 
to provide the Uganda National Minimum Health Care Package (UNMHCP) in all facilities. 
The per capita cost was roughly US$41.2 in 2008/09 and will rise to US$47.9 in 2011/12 
(MoH,  2009b).  Yet,  the  Medium  Term  Expenditure  Framework  (MTEF)  estimation  was 
US$12.5 in 2008/09, signifying a shortfall of about US$29 (MoH, 2009b). At the time of the 
field research, government was contributing only 20 percent of the drugs, which covered 50 
percent  of  the  health  needs.  The  third  parties  including  development  partners  were 
contributing 80 percent of drugs (in terms of value). Donors are the main funders of anti-
malarials  (mainly  coartem)  and  Anti-Retroviral  Drugs  (ARVs).  This  high  degree  of  donor 
dependence is unsustainable. 
1.5.  The third justification for this study is the apparently high level of inefficiency and 
wastage  in  the  medicines  sub-sector.  While  the  low  level  of  health  sector  financing  is  
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deplorable,  the  inefficiencies  in  the  system  are  inexcusable.  The  Office  of  the  Auditor 
General (AG)’s Report to Parliament covering FY2006/2007, outlines several flaws in the 
flows of medicines.  It  is  reported that government  allocated  Shs19.6bn  to  the  National 
Medical  Stores  (NMS);  but  NMS  delivered  drugs  and  medical  supplies  worth  Shs13bn, 
making a shortfall of Shs6.2bn (see Monitor 16 January 2009, page 1). The MoH was also 
accused of diverting to overseas travel the sum of Shs410.6 m that was meant for the 
purchase of drugs. This reallocation from item No. 224001 (Medical Supplies/Drugs) was 
allegedly done without proper authorization. These cases suggest that money for essential 
drugs are wasted or diverted to selfish ends. While government is urged to step up the level 
of health sector financing, all officials and all implementing units within the health system 
must utilize the funds efficiently and effectively. In other words, they must demonstrate 
value for money. 
Analytical Framework 
 
1.6.  The analytical approach adopted  by  this  study  is  the “framework of accountability 
relationships” that was articulated in the World Development Report of the World Bank 
(2004) entitled: Making Services Work for Poor People. This analytical framework has five 
cardinal principles of effective service delivery, namely: delegation, financing, performance, 
information and enforceability. All these must work together to maximize service delivery. 
For  example,  decentralization  in  Uganda  resulted  in  the  delegation  of  duties  from  the 
central MoH to Local Governments (LoGs). However, decentralized health services can only 
work  if  there  is  (a)  adequate  financing  (for  staff,  drugs,  and  equipment);  (b)  clear 
performance measurements (e.g. at the health facility level); (c) proper information flows 
(hence the importance of the Health Management Information Systems (HMIS); and (d) 
effective  supervision,  inspection  and  enforcement  of  performance  standards.  The 
performance standards have to be enforced by MoH, the DHOs, local politicians, the HSDs, 
the  Health Unit  Management  Committees  (HUMCs)  or  even the  police  (as  in  situations 
where medicines or Primary Health Care (PHC) funds are stolen). In cases where all or most 
of these accountability variables work well, satisfactory services are provided. Where all or 
most of these factors are lacking, poor services result. 
Methods and Data 
 
1.7.  The methods of data collection were largely – but not exclusively – qualitative. The 
study started with a comprehensive review of both published and unpublished literature. Of 
crucial importance were the Acts of Parliament, the Health Sector Strategic Plans I&II (HSSP 
I,  II)  and  the  sector  specific  (MoH)  guidelines.  Critical  analyses  of  the  institutional 
partnerships crafted between different stakeholders (e.g. NMS and third parties; central 
agencies, LoGs; and NGOs) were conducted. The aim was to establish whether or not these 
partnerships  are  viable  for  improved  delivery  of  medicines.  In-depth  interviews  were 
conducted with top officials of MoH, NMS, NDA, and Quality Chemicals Industries Limited 
(QCIL). In all cases, what works, what does not and why, were assessed. 
1.8.  Field visits were then carried out in five districts – Apac, Hoima, Kamuli, Mubende and 
Rukungiri. Within the districts, field observations were made, stock cards examined, and the 
key officials in the different health facilities, that is, the regional referral hospitals, district 
hospitals, and the health centres ranging from HC IV down to HC II were interviewed. In all  
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cases, the district referral hospitals were purposively selected. To gain deep insights into the 
drug  delivery  mechanisms,  a  total  of  10  government  health  facilities  were  randomly 
selected in each sampled district. These health facilities were selected by stratifying the 
health care system to select a mix of urban, peri-urban and rural facilities. Also covered 
were purposively selected NGO health facilities. The aim was to compare the functionality of 
public health facilities vis-à-vis those run by faith-based NGOs. Overall, a total of 50 in-
charges were interviewed, one per health facility, giving a total of 45 in-charges from the 
health  centres  and  5  from  the  referral  and  district  hospitals.  In  addition,  Focus  Group 
Discussions (FGDs) and exit interviews with service beneficiaries were conducted. The aim 
was to assess the level of drug delivery (satisfactory or unsatisfactory), and establish the 
degree to which  local  communities  hold  elected politicians  as  well  as technical/medical 
workers to account for their actions or inactions. 
1.9.  Within the national and local governance structures of health services, the challenges 
faced by NMS in drug procurement and disbursement were investigated; and the delivery of 
drugs (in money terms) from the national level to the DHOs and HSDs were tracked. From 
the  DHO  to  the  lower  health  centres,  the  degree  to  which  the  credit  line  medicines 
delivered by NMS and received by the DHO reach the intended beneficiaries in a timely 
manner was assessed (via interviews, field observations, and critical analyses of records). 
The focus was on the last three disbursements during May 2008 to April 2009. A similar 
approach was followed for medicines under PHC. However, the reference period was on 
medicines procured from July 2008 to March 2009 (FY2008/09). Analyses of the health-
related auxiliary infrastructure (e.g. the local road networks, the tooling of the DHO, and the 
telephone and IT penetration  rates)  were done  to  contextualize  the  challenges  of  drug 
delivery within the districts and HSDs. Finally, FGDs, field interviews and observations were 
used to assess the role of the HUMCs and health sector NGOs in the delivery of medicines. 
The data collection instruments included structured questionnaires, key informant interview 
guides, FGD guides, and a camera. 
Highlight of Major Findings 
 
1.10.  Medicines versus underlying determinants of health:  Medicines undoubtedly 
offer  a  simple,  cost-effective  solution  to  medical  ailments,  provided  they  are  available, 
affordable, and properly
 used. However, evidence from this study shows that neither the 
flow nor the usage of medicines can be boosted unless the underlying determinants of good 
health  are  addressed.  The  supportive/auxiliary  infrastructure  (e.g.  staff  housing;  solar 
power; phone network coverage; the quality of roads; water and sanitation; and the quality 
of schools) was found to be inadequate. During fieldwork it was observed that the ‘hard-to-
reach’  areas  are  hard  to  reach  precisely  because  of  poor  auxiliary  infrastructure. 
Government needs to invest in auxiliary infrastructure as a matter of urgency. 
1.11.  Stock  outs  of  medicines:  A  top  HSSP  II  policy  target  was  increasing  the 
percentage  of  health  facilities  without  any  stock  outs  of  first  line  anti-malarial  drugs, 
measles vaccine, Depo Provera, Oral Rehydration Solution (ORS) and cotrimoxazole from 40 
percent in 2003/04 to 100 percent in 2009/10. This policy target has not been attained. The 
in-charges of the public health facilities reported (in nine out of every 10 cases) that they 
experienced stock outs of anti-malarials and basic medical supplies – such as gloves within 
the six months that preceded the visits. This is worse than the MoH report that “72 percent  
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of government health units experience stock outs of at least one indicator medicines”. Some 
dissatisfied patients who were being asked to purchase medicines and medical supplies 
satisfied  from  private  drugs  shops  alleged  that  health  workers  were  diverting  public 
medicines to their private clinics/drug shops. No concrete evidence of this was found. What 
is clear is that drug stock outs are a huge obstacle that must be overcome if people’s access 
to medicines is to improve dramatically. 
1.12.  Decentralised  health  delivery  system:  Uganda  currently  has  a  complex 
decentralized health system. It consists of the district health infrastructure consisting of 
Village Health Teams/Health Centre I (VHTs or HC Is), HCs II, III and IV plus general district 
hospitals.  Beyond  the  district,  the  health  system  has  Regional  Referral  Hospitals  and 
National Referral Hospitals. Such a complex system calls for proper coordination, support 
supervision and inspection. Health facility in-charges reported that while MoH was doing a 
commendable job in policy formulation, and provision of nationally coordinated services 
such as epidemic control, more serious support supervision and inspection were needed. 
Weak inspection was reported to be a top factor in explaining why credit line and PHC 
medicines do not always reach the beneficiaries. The CAOs, DHOs, DHTs and HSD medical 
officers particularly need to increase the scale, scope and regularity of support supervision 
in their areas of jurisdiction. 
1.13.  Proliferation  of  districts:  The  proliferation  of  districts  is  placing  more 
responsibility for support supervision and monitoring on the MoH. Yet the MoH budget is 
not necessarily increasing proportionately to cater for the rising need for more field staff, 
vehicles and time. Within the newly created districts, the weak institutional and human 
resource capacities have compromised the procurement, distribution and use of medicines. 
For example, VHTs are important in deepening health awareness and promoting the use of 
health services. However, only 30 of the over 80 districts have trained VHTs. New districts 
dominate the list of districts with untrained VHTs or weak HUMCs. Uganda needs to put a 
break on the proliferation of districts. The MoH should also create health districts that 
combine  several  political  districts.  Smaller  political  districts  should,  from  the  health 
perspective, become HSDs. 
1.14.  Physical access versus actual access: Government investment in HCs (II- IV) 
dramatically  improved  physical  access  to  the  health  facilities.  Today,  72  percent  of 
households live within 5km of a health facility (public or NGO). The challenge is that while 
physical  access  improved,  effective  access  to  medicines  has  not.  Evidence  shows  that 
utilization is limited because of inadequate medicines and health supplies, worsened by the 
low functionality of wards at HC IVs, the shortage of qualified health workers, and the de-
motivation of the few that exist. 
1.15.  Shortage/low motivation of health workers: Inadequate human resources have 
constrained the ability of Uganda’s health sector to fulfil its mandate. In November 2008, 51 
percent of the approved positions in the public health service were filled (MoH, 2009b). 
Moreover, wide variations exist among districts. For example, Pader had 35 percent of the 
posts filled. Butologo HC II in Mubende district (a difficult to reach area located 25 miles 
from  Mubende  town),  had  only  one  nurse  (Elizabeth  Iripo),  who  was  observably 
overworked. Shortages of critical staff such as nurses, doctors, nutritionists, and anaesthetic 
and laboratory workers, have greatly constrained the provision of medicines and health  
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services in general. Some districts (such as Rukungiri) are more able than others (such as 
Hoima, Kamuli and Mubende) to advertise vacant positions, fill them, and cause their health 
workers to access the payroll. According to an interviewee, Rukungiri recruited even when 
there was a ban on recruitment, and their health workers accessed the payroll. In Rukungiri, 
support staff such as guards and cleaners, were on government payroll. In Kamuli, nursing 
assistants were observed mopping the floor of health facilities (there was no money to pay 
cleaners).  In  Hoima,  a night  guard  at  Kikuube  HC  IV  had  stopped  working  because  his 
monthly salary of Ushs40, 000 (which was paid from PHC funds) was in arrears for four 
months. At the time of fieldwork, the solar panel at the health facility had been stolen. 
1.16.  Government must address one key challenge: Health workers operate under 
de-motivating terms and conditions of service. A fresh medical officer in a public health 
facility, for example, earns less than Ushs800,000 per month (or US$400). The nurses and 
midwives each earn about Ushs350,000 (or US$175) per month. Many of the health workers 
who are trained with Ugandan taxpayers’ money are migrating to other countries where 
they are paid substantially higher rates. Government needs to motivate health workers (and 
other public servants). 
1.17.  The role of NGOs: The NGO or faith-based health facilities (Private-Not-for-
Profit Organizations (PNFPs) play a key role in health. The facility-based NGOs account for 
41 percent of the hospitals and 22 percent of the lower health facilities. With government’s 
financial support, the NGO sector operates 70 percent of the health training institutions. 
This is an important contribution. Yet, the NGO health centres (such as the Catholic-based 
Nyakibale Hospital) charge user fees. While community members predominantly rated the 
services of faith-based hospitals as being better than public hospitals, many found the user 
fees to be unaffordable, given the high levels of rural poverty. The challenge for government 
is to simultaneously boost people’s accessibility to medicines and address the affordability 
issue. An added challenge is that faith-based health facilities typically emphasize clinical 
work for which they charge fees. This carries the risk of neglecting public health education. 
Yet, 75 percent of Uganda’s disease burden can be overcome through health education 
promotion and prevention. This calls for rethinking of the role of the NGO sector vis-à-vis 
the public health sector in Uganda. 
1.18.  Guidelines versus conditionality: The credit line funds (for buying medicines) 
are  given  to  NMS  to  procure  medicines  and  health  supplies;  while  the  PHC  funds  are 
decentralized to the districts. Under the MoH guidelines, 50 percent of PHC funds should be 
spent on medicines to supplement those procured by NMS. The study has established that 
this arrangement is subject to abuse. Drug stock outs were more common among districts 
(such as Hoima) that take PHC guidelines as mere guidelines in comparison with districts 
(such as Rukungiri) that take the MoH guidelines as rules, and strictly spend 50 percent of 
PHC  funds on  medicines.  This, points  to  the  need  for standardization  and  enforcement 
across different districts. 
1.19.  Health Management Information Systems (HMIS): Health facilities are required 
to compile financial summaries, on a monthly basis, indicating funds received and funds 
spent in the categories of PHC wage, PHC non-wage, PHC development, local governments, 
credit lines (medicine), donor projects, and others (to be specified). In the management of 
medicines, health facilities are supposed to use stock cards to track the movements and  
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balance of all medicines in the health unit and the extent of (monthly) stock outs. However, 
a problem of incomplete or irregular data was found. Use of data for planning purposes was 
found to be low.  Most of the  health  facilities  visited did not  complete  the  sections on 
medicines  stock  outs,  health  facility  management  and  funds  received  and  used.  This 
problem was largely attributed to low motivation and under-staffing. 
1.20.  Institutional weaknesses: One of key observation was that the flow of funds 
from MoFPED to NMS through MoH breeds avoidable inefficiencies. There was no justifiable 
reason  why  credit-line  money  was  not  transferred  directly  from  MoFPED  to  NMS.  It  is 
suggested that the proportion of PHC funds being decentralized to districts to supplement 
NMS medicines should be given to NMS to procure drugs. As NMS gets adequate and timely 
financial  resources,  the  MoH  should  strengthen  its  supervisory  capabilities  and  exert 
pressure on NMS to deliver its mandate. A problem regarding coordination of third parties 
was also observed. Each party comes with its interests. For example, DANIDA provides funds 
directly  into  budget  support  whereas  USAID  does  not.  Instead  USAID  brings  its  own 
medicines and has its own supply chain. Third parties need to be effectively coordinated to 
serve national interests. 
1.21.  On the local manufacture of medicines: The recent partnership between GoU, 
QCIL, and Chemical, Industrial and Pharmaceutical Laboratories (CIPLA) of India, presents a 
unique opportunity for the state-of-the-art technology transfer from India to Uganda. It 
presents a rare opportunity for the local manufacture of medicines. The challenge is to 
ensure that foreign pharmaceutical giants do not suffocate local pharmaceutical firms to 
death – for example, via the ‘donation of free’ drugs. Government must not let this happen. 
It  must also ensure  that the  quality of local medicines  remains  high. People’s  negative 
perceptions that locally manufactured medicines are of poor quality need to be corrected 
with verifiable evidence of high quality locally manufactured products. The National Drug 
Authority (NDA), the Government Chemists and MoH have a key role to play in ensuring that 
locally manufactured medicines are safe, effective and affordable. 
1.22.   Health Unit Management Committees (HUMCs): The HUMCs are “voices” of 
the final beneficiaries of medicine. They are supposed to witness the arrival of medicines 
and ensure that the medicines actually reach the community. Members of HUMCs do not 
earn a salary. Some  health  facilities  in  some  districts have  more effective HUMCs  than 
others. The challenge for government is not to abolish HUMCs, but to make them more 
effective.  Government  may  wish  to  document  the  good  practises  and  spread  them 
elsewhere in the country. 
1.23.   Inadequate laboratories, Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs) and other essentials: 
Drug stock outs were less serious in some districts (such as Rukungiri) that have laboratories 
and diagnostic kits for malaria than districts (such as Hoima, Kamuli, Mubende), which lack 
these facilities. The illegal stocking and subsequent abuse of drugs by households, together 
with  the  rising  resistance  to  medicines,  were  less  serious  problems  where  diagnostic 
facilities  existed. The challenge for government is to mobilize resources  for investing in 
laboratories and rapid diagnostic kits across the country. These, as indicated in Chapter 3, 
are affordable. [For example, a microscope – which is an important facility in laboratories – 
costs less than US$300]. The MoH and the DHOs also need to improve the functionality of 
theatres at all HC IVs and other health facilities. There is also need for improving the supply  
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of gloves and syringes; increasing investments in ambulances; streamlining of the referral 
system; and continuously equipping health workers with new knowledge. 
Conclusions 
1.24.  The  main  conclusion  is  that  the  flaws  in  the  flow  of  medicines  can  be 
overcome. What is needed is greater determination in improving the governance of the 
health sector; the mobilization of adequate financial, logistical and human resources; and 
the effective coordination of the different institutional actors in the health system. The 
challenge is big but not insurmountable. Key actions highlighted: 
1.25.  Money for medicines (both credit line and PHC) should be transferred directly 
from MoFPED to NMS. This will involve two reforms. First, stopping the decentralization to 
districts of the 50 percent PHC funds meant for medicines. [This money should now go 
straight to NMS]. Second, the credit line fund should stop going through MoH to NMS.  A 
valid concern has been raised, namely that this reform will effectively put the medicines and 
the money together as was the case during the days of the Central Medical Stores (CMS). 
This will not be a problem if a third initiative is embarked on, namely, strengthening the 
supervisory  capability  of  MoH.  A  strong inspection  department in  the  MoH  will  ensure 
proper utilization of the money by NMS. Should this require revision of the NMS Statute, 
then it should be done expeditiously. Exceptions to this proposal would be hospitals (both 
referral  and  district  hospitals)  to  which  MoFPED  should  directly  transfer  money  for 
medicine. The condition here should be that they purchase medicines from either the NMS 
or JMS only. Any money for medicines that is not utilised should be returned to the MoFPED 
at the end of the financial year. 
1.26.  The line MoH should hold NMS managers personally accountable for what 
goes right or wrong in NMS. Tough measures must be put in place (by MoH, MoFPED and 
the President) to punish NMS management (a) if essential medicines (like anti-malarials) are 
inadequate; (b) if NMS delivers medicines that are  not requested by clients; (c) if NMS 
dumps onto lower health facilities drugs that have less than three months’ shelf-life; or (d) if 
NMS  delays  to  deliver  medicines  on  time.  The  aim  of  these  tough  interventions  is  to 
improve efficiency in delivery of medicines. 
1.27.  To  overcome  the  widespread  problem  of  drug stock outs,  NMS  should be 
given adequate capitalization to enable it procure 100 percent of the drugs requested by 
clients. Once NMS has financial autonomy and adequate capitalization, there should be zero 
tolerance  to  NMS’s  perpetual  problem  of  non-availability  of  medicines.  The  NMS  must 
purchase the medicines requested for from the market, including JMS and/or other private 
pharmacies in line with national procurement guidelines. In other words, NMS should be 
given an expanded mandate of procuring and distributing all medicines. 
1.28.  The abuses of drugs by individuals/households together with the associated 
problem  of  rising  resistance  to  medicines  were  less  serious  where  diagnostic  facilities 
existed.  Government  must  invest  in  laboratories  and  rapid  diagnostic  kits  across  the 
country. These are important and affordable. 
1.29.  Evidence shows that high quality auxiliary infrastructure matters. Government, 
in collaboration with its development partners, should invest in staff housing, solar power,  
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improved IT and telephone connectivity, quality roads, water and sanitation, among others. 
These play a fundamental role in the attraction and retention of health workers in any 
specific  locality.  A  dramatic  improvement  in  auxiliary  infrastructure  will  eradicate  the 
problem of ‘hard-to-reach’ areas. 
1.30.  A framework for coordinating donors in the health sector needs to be worked 
out expeditiously to avoid disruption of NMS activities. One way of doing this is by NMS 
creating a special unit to handle medicine supplies by “third parties”. A clear procurement 
and distribution calendar of medicines supplied by third parties is necessary. 
1.31.  Operational funds for various levels of health units should be determined a 
priori and transferred from the MoFPED to the MoH and then directly to beneficiary health 
institutions, which include the Office of the DHO, the health sub-district (HSD) and lower 
level health centres (HC IIs, HC IIIs and HC IVs).  At the district level, the district health 
inspection system should be strengthened to ensure proper utilization of operational funds 
in lower level health centres. The MoH should not allow health units to pay wages for any 
category  of  workers  from  operational  funds.  All  workers  should  be  recruited  and  their 
wages paid directly by the Ministry of Public Service (MoPS). 
1.32.  At  the  district  level,  the  CAOs  must  ensure  that  medicines  reach  the 
beneficiaries. Additionally, the DHO, the HSD medical officer, the in-charges of lower level 
health centres and very importantly, the police, ISO and DISO and GISO have an important 
leadership  role  to  play  in  inspecting,  monitoring  or  even  evaluating  the  availability  of 
medicines. Together, they can ensure that medicines and medical services are available to 
people. Then, and only then, the diseases of the poor would be overcome. 
1.33.  The PHC funding is spread so thinly across the lower health levels leading to 
unintended inefficiencies. It is proposed that government should improve and strengthen 
infrastructure at HC IIIs with the aim of reducing the burden on higher health facilities. This 
should enable the referral hospitals to focus on their mandate. This also calls for revisiting 
the referral system between HC IIs and HC IIIs.  
 
1
2.  Introduction 
 
2.1.  Over  the  last  few  decades,  health  has  attained  worldwide  recognition  as  a  crucial 
component of human development and poverty eradication. This recognition springs, in 
part, from the realisation that one third of the world population lacks access to essential 
medicines.  This  critically  contributes  to  further  poverty,  mortality,  morbidity  and 
indebtedness (WHO, 2004). The 2009 Report of the Special United Nations Rapporteur on 
the  Right  to  Health,  for  example,  observes  that  the  diseases  of  the  poor  –  that  is, 
communicable, maternal, prenatal, and nutritional diseases – still account for 50 percent of 
the burden of disease in developing countries (nearly 10 times higher than in developed 
countries). Second, improving access to medicines alone could save 10 m lives a year – four 
m in Africa and south Asia. Third, the right to health is an inclusive right, which extends not 
only to the timely delivery of medicines, but also the underlying determinants of health. 
These  include  things  like  sanitation  and  access  to  clean  water;  proper  nutrition;  the 
availability of highly motivated health workers; and auxiliary infrastructure such as housing 
for health workers, access to roads, and solar equipment to keep vaccines in rural health 
centres at the right temperatures. In this study focus is made on the delivery mechanisms of 
medicines in Uganda. But the underlying determinants of good health are not forgotten. 
2.2.  During FY2008/09 Government allocated UShs.628.5 bn to the health sector which was 
an increase from UShs.428.26 bn in the previous financial year. In FY2009/10, sector funding 
will  be  further  increased  to  consolidate  past  achievements  and  execute  strategies  for 
obtaining even better results. Specifically, government increased the allocation to PHC from 
UShs.130.6bn  in  FY2007/08  to  Ushs.  157.6bn  in  FY2008/09  and  the  increase  will  be 
sustained in FY2009/10. Public spending per capita was US$ 8.2 in 2007/2008 for the health 
sector, which is equivalent to 9.6 percent of government expenditure. While spending more 
on health is a welcome development, Uganda is yet to achieve good health outcomes. This 
is evident from Uganda’s inability to achieve health-related policy targets as highlighted in 
the Poverty Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) (2004) and the various HSSP ( I & II). 
2.3.  Uganda  has  a  high  burden  of  disease.  Malaria,  malnutrition,  Respiratory  Tract 
Infections (RTI), HIV/AIDS, (with average prevalence of infection of 6.4 percent), dysentery, 
diarrhoea, and TB are the leading causes of morbidity and mortality (MoH, 2009). These are 
essentially diseases of the poor as they are more prevalent among the poor compared to the 
rich (UBoS, 2007). Indeed, a direct relationship exists between poverty and the incidence of 
these  common  diseases.  By  implication,  therefore,  poverty  eradication  is  an  important 
factor in the struggle against diseases. 
2.4.  The  diseases  of  the  poor  have  recently  been  compounded  by  the  rise  of  non-
communicable diseases (NCDs), which are predominantly ‘diseases of the rich’. The NCDs 
are  an  emerging  challenge  and  include  hypertension,  cardiovascular  diseases,  diabetes, 
cancer, and mental illness. The increase in NCDs is attributed to multiple factors such as the 
sedentary life of emerging elite class; use of expired or counterfeit imported medicines; 
increased  exposure  to  radiation  (associated  with  mobile  phones,  TVs,  etc);  and  the 
metabolic side effects linked to life-long AIDS drugs. Uganda’s governance flaws exacerbate 
the situation. The governance related flaws include weak regulation or poor enforcement of 
regulations on harmful substances such as alcohol/methanol that recently killed 19 people  
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and left 27 hospitalized in the first week of September 2009 (Monitor 5 September 2009; 
New Vision, 5 September 2009). 
2.5.  Uganda’s  high  burden  of  disease  calls  for  intensive,  focused  and  well  coordinated 
interventions. The MoH (2009) reports that 75 percent of the disease burden in Uganda can 
be prevented through health education promotion and prevention. If this does not happen, 
the budget for medicines will necessarily go up.  
Rationale for this Study 
2.6.  The  delivery  of  the  UNMHCP  is  premised  on  at  least  one  assumption,  that  is,  an 
efficient and effective flow of medicines in the health system. Yet, the Ugandan media 
suggest that there are important flaws in the flow of medicines. For example, The Monitor 
lead story of 16 January 2009 entitled: ‘Govt spent Shs6 bn on ghost drugs…’ raises two key 
issues.  First, it highlights  the  Office  of the  Auditor General (AG)’s  report to Parliament 
covering  the  2006/2007  financial  year,  in  which  the  AG  reveals  that  government  had 
allocated Shs19.6bn to the NMS. However, NMS delivered drugs and medical supplies worth 
Shs13bn, making a shortfall of Shs6.2bn. This became a subject of investigation by the Public 
Accounts Committee (PAC) of Parliament. Was the money for essential drugs being diverted 
to selfish ends? Second, MoH was being accused of diverting to overseas travel the sum of 
Shs410.6 m that was meant for the purchase  of drugs. This reallocation from item No. 
224001 (Medical Supplies/Drugs) was allegedly done without proper authorization.  
2.7.  Such anomalies in the drugs/medicines sub-sector constitute the major rationale for 
this study. This study  is  important to the  people and Government  of  Uganda  (GoU) in 
several ways. First, it provides evidence and designs policy messages that will be used to 
improve the delivery of medicines. Second, efficiency, effectiveness and timeliness in the 
use of health-sector resources are addressed.  
2.8.  The study follows  closely  the  accountability  relations  in  the  public  service  delivery 
framework, which was developed in the World Development Report of the World Bank 
(2004), entitled “Making Services Work for the Poor”. The study also employs the Public 
Expenditure Tracking Surveys (PETS) tool to understand the flow of medicines in the health 
system in Uganda. For example, the study seeks to investigate the proportion of medicines - 
in money terms- that actually reach the health facility vis-à-vis what was released.  Several 
PETS have been undertaken in Uganda with the aim of improving flow of funds. The most 
widely publicized is on capitation grants to schools on which basis the Ministry of Finance, 
Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) started publishing funds in newspapers (see 
Reineika and Smith, 2004). Another study by Lindelöw et al. (2003) focused on drug stock 
outs at health facilities and user perceptions; but the study did not examine the medicine 
delivery systems.  In other words, Lindelöw et al. (2003) did not track medicines from the 
national level to the frontline health facilities. Nor have the previous studies included the 
beneficiaries or addressed the relevant institutional linkages. This present study tracks the 
flow of funds for medicines as well as the medicines to the lowest health facility. It also 






Purpose and Objectives of the Study 
 
2.9.  The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  deepen  understanding of  the  system  of  delivering 
medicines in Uganda. More specifically, the study focuses on the following issues: First, it 
examines  the  viability  of  the  institutional  partnerships  forged  between  the  different 
stakeholders in the drug delivery system. Of particular importance are the partnerships 
between  NMS,  Joint  Medical  Stores  (JMS)  and  third parties;  between  central  and  local 
government agencies; and between relevant NGOs and the local governments in their areas 
of operation. Second, the study seeks to investigate the challenges faced by NMS in the 
procurement  and  disbursement  of  drugs,  and  in  what  ways  these  challenges  can  be 
overcome. The study tracks the flow of funds for, and the supplies of, drugs/medicines with 
a view to determining the pattern of expenditure allocation, and whether all resources 
allocated  to  the  medicines  sub-sector  reach  their  intended  beneficiaries.  Third,  the 
transportation of medicines from the District Health Office (DHO) and Health Sub-Districts 
(HSDs) to the lower-level heath centres is highlighted. Fourth, the management of stocks at 
the facility level, the problem of drug stock outs, and the perception of service users based 
on the Focus Group Discussions and exit interviews are documents. Fifth, the challenges 
encountered in the acquisition, distribution and utilisation of the medicines are discussed. 
Finally,  conclusions  and  recommendations  are  presented.  The  task  at  hand  cannot  be 
effectively realized unless health is located in the broader context of public service delivery. 
This is the focus of the next section. 
Context of Health Service Delivery in Uganda 
 
2.10.  The history of public service delivery in Uganda is a history of ups and downs. 
From the 1960s to the mid-1970s, Uganda had one of the most effective public service 
systems in sub-Saharan Africa. The country’s civil service in general and the health system, 
in particular, was one of the finest. Uganda’s health sector used to work efficiently. There 
was an effective referral system from the village dispensaries and district hospitals to the 
national  referral  hospital  (Mulago).  During  the  1970s  and  early  1980s,  many  of  these 
institutional systems collapsed, resulting in substantial deterioration of the health outcome 
indicators. While several reforms have been undertaken in the health sector, with a view to 
improving  health  outcome  indicators,  progress  has  stagnated  since  the  late  1990s. 
Nonetheless, GoU remains committed to improving the delivery of medicines and medical 
services.  What  is  not  clear  is  why  the  wish  to  improve  the  flow  of  medicines  is  not 
effectively translated into improved practices. Hence the importance of the present study. 
Reforms within the Health Sector 
2.11.   Since 1986, government has implemented several sector-specific reforms. In 
the health sector, the reforms started with the establishment of the Health Policy Review 
Commission (1986–1989). This was followed by several other reforms but this study focuses 
its discussion to those reforms directly related to drug/medicines.  
2.12.   It  is  worth  noting  that  the  GoU  provides  free  health  care  to  the  people 
including availing them with essential drugs for common illnesses like malaria. The rationale 
of government is that drugs offer a simple, cost-effective solution to many health
 problems, 
provided  they  are  available,  affordable,  and  properly
  used.  Second,  improving  the 
availability and affordability of essential medicines of assured quality is central to increasing  
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access to healthcare and improving health outcomes for the poor. Two institutional actors 
play a key role in the procurement and/or distribution of medicines in Uganda – the NMS 
and Joint Medical Stores (JMS). The former is required to procure essential medicines and 
health supplies for public health facilities; the latter procures medicine mainly for faith-
based health facilities. The JMS is the second call after NMS as regards utilisation of the PHC 
budget, which represents a strong partnership between the public and private sector in the 
procurement of medicines and health supplies. 
a) From Central Medical Stores to National Medical Stores 
2.13.     The NMS was  established  by  the National Medical  Stores Statute, which 
came into effect on December 03, 1993. The NMS replaced the Central Medical Stores 
(CMS), which was a department within the MoH. The main concern, then, was that the 
functionality of CMS was constrained by lack of autonomy. Second, the fusion of money and 
medicines in one institution – the MoH – was widely associated with inefficiency, lack of 
accountability and the absence of institutional checks on the flow of pharmaceuticals and 
medical supplies. As a major outcome, essential drugs/medical supplies were not reaching 
the people at the right time. Nor were they being delivered in the right quantities via a 
supply-driven approach. 
2.14.   To  overcome  the  anomalies  associated  with  the  old  supply-driven  CMS 
regime, government created NMS in 1993. Through the NMS statute, the MoH delegated its 
drug supply function to NMS. Drug supply involves the identification of therapeutic needs, 
quantification of the current and future needs, procurement, distribution and use. Like CMS, 
the NMS operates under the national health policies defined by the line MoH. Unlike CMS, 
however, NMS works in the context of the national drug policy that is enforced by the NDA. 
The NDA was created by the National Drug Policy and Authority Act, 1993, and came into 
effect on the same day as the NMS. In line with its mandate of enforcing the national drug 
policy, the NDA oversees the quality-related operations of pharmacies including the NMS. 
The NMS is also different from CMS in that it is an autonomous corporation created in the 
principal of demand (pull system) for medicines as opposed to the supply (push system) 
under the CMS regime. This autonomy signifies the separation of money from the medicine. 
But  as  demonstrated  in  the  subsequent  chapters,  there  was  limited  value  addition  in 
changing from CMS to NMS. Thus, one of the key recommendations is that the best aspects 
of the CMS system should be resuscitated.  
b) The rise of Joint Medical Stores (JMS) 
2.15.   The JMS was founded in 1979 as a joint venture between the Uganda Catholic 
Medical Bureau (UCMB) and the Uganda Protestant Medical Bureau (UPMB). The aim was 
to  supply  quality  medicines,  medical  equipment  and  related  health  care  and  training 
services to the people of Uganda at an affordable price and to the glory of God. JMS was 
initially set up to supply medical relief to the health facilities owned by the Protestant and 
Catholic  churches.  With  time,  however,  JMS  evolved  into  a  not-for-profit  wholesale 
enterprise,  procuring,  storing  and  selling  over  2000  products.  These  products  include 
pharmaceuticals,  medical  and  surgical  sundries,  medical  equipment/instruments  and 
laboratory  supplies.  JMS  has  expanded  its  regular  customer’s  base  to  include  church 
founded health facilities, national and international NGOs, government health units, private 




Health Sector Strategic Plan (HSSP) 
2.16.   The overall development goal of the HSSP I was the attainment of a good 
standard of health by all people in Uganda, in order to promote a healthy and productive life 
(MoH, 2005: 8). This is consistent with Uganda’s National Health Policy (MoH, 1999). The 
program goal of the HSSP I was Reduced morbidity and mortality from the major causes of 
ill-health and premature death, and reduced disparities therein. Both the development and 
the program goals were to be attained through universal delivery of the UNMHCP, whose 
key  components  were:  (a)  control  of  communicable  diseases,  particularly  malaria, 
STI/HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis; (b) integrated management of childhood illness at all health 
facilities and households; (c) sexual and reproductive health promotion putting emphasis on 
essential ante-natal and obstetric care, family planning, adolescent reproductive health, and 
violence against women; and (d) other public health interventions such as immunization, 
health education, school health, epidemics and disaster prevention, and improved mental 
health. The main policy elements of HSSP I relevant for the present study are as follows: 
￿  Preferentially allocating resources to PHC and in favour of lower levels of care. The 
aim  was  to  increase  availability  of  essential  health  system  inputs  particularly 
vaccines, drugs, human resources, medical equipment and health infrastructure; 
￿  Paying greater attention to health promotion, disease prevention and empowerment 
of individuals and communities to play an active role in heath development; 
￿  Equitable distribution of health services throughout the country, giving priority to 
further decentralization of the health care delivery system. The aim was to ensure 
effective access by all to the UNMHCP; 
￿  Improving access to health care by increasing health infrastructure and abolishing 
user-charges in all government facilities except the private wings of hospitals. User-
charges were formally abolished in 2001;  
￿  Up-scaling the struggle against the leading killer diseases – Malaria, HIV/AIDS and 
Tuberculosis; and 





2.17.   The  study  focuses  on  some  of  the  above  drug/medicines  related  policy 
elements of the HSSP. A mapping of these and other health indicators suggests that certain 
districts are doing better than others, notwithstanding the fact that the same line ministry 
supervises all districts. All districts operate under the same national policy framework. They 
all  receive  credit-line  medicines  and  decentralized  PHC  funds.  So  what  explains  the 
variations in the health performance indicators across districts and in what ways can the 
poor performers learn from the top performers?  
2.18.    This  study  argues  that  the  challenges  of  delivering  drugs  in  Uganda  are 
closely associated with (a) the institutional partnerships forged in the delivery of drugs; (b) 
the  effectiveness  of  NMS  in  drug  procurement  and  disbursement;  (c)  the  effective  or 
ineffective usage of funds meant for drugs under credit-line, third parties and PHC; and (d) 
the quality of district-level drug acquisition and delivery mechanisms. The rest of this study 
is devoted to highlighting these issue-areas.  
2.19.    The rest of the study is structured as follows: The analytical framework and 
methodology that guided the research are presented in the next chapter. Chapter Three 
presents a discussion  of the institutional partnerships  in the  delivery  of  medicines.  The 
procurement, disbursement  and  tracking  of  medicines are  the  subject of  Chapter  Four. 
Perceptions of the beneficiaries and in-charges of lower health facilities are discussed in 
Chapter  Five.  Chapter  Six focuses  on  the  challenges  in  the  acquisition, distribution  and 




3.  Analytical Approach and Methods 
Analytical approach 
 
3.1.  The analytical approach adopted  by  this  study  is  the  “framework of accountability 
relationships”  articulated  in  the  2004  World  Bank  World  Development  Report  entitled: 
Making  Services  Work  for  Poor  People.  Studies  that  have  adopted  this  framework  to 
understand decentralized service delivery have yielded fruitful findings – for example in 
India (World Bank, 2006). 
3.2.  The analytical framework  (Figure  1)  has five  cardinal principles  of  effective  service 
delivery, namely: delegation, financing, performance, information and enforceability. These 
must work together to maximize service delivery. For example, decentralization in Uganda 
resulted  in  the  delegation of duties  from  the  central  MoH  to  local  governments  (LGs). 
Theoretically, decentralization brought services closer to the people. But the practice may 
be different, depending on several context-specific dynamics. 
3.3.  Decentralized health services can only work if there is: (a) adequate financing (for staff, 
drugs, and equipment); (b) clear performance measurements (e.g. at the level of health 
units  and  districts);  (c)  proper  information  flows  (hence  the  importance  of  the  health 
management  information  systems  (HMIS);  and  (d)  effective  supervision,  inspection  and 
enforcement of performance standards by MoH, the DHO, local politicians, the HSD, the 
health unit management committees (HUMCs) or even the police (as in situations where 
medicines  or  PHC  funds  are  stolen).  In  cases  or  countries  where  all  or  most  of  the 
accountability variables work well, satisfactory services are provided. Where all or most of 
these factors are lacking, poor services are found.  
3.4.  But that is not all. Evidence shows that the accountability variables are necessary, but 
not sufficient predictors of the quality of services provided. The governance structure, that 
is,  the  way  the  service  delivery  system  is  organized,  matters  a  lot.  It  is  within  this 
governance  structure  that  strong  accountability  relationships  must  be  forged  between 
policymakers, service providers and beneficiaries. 
3.5.  Policymakers  determine  the  level  and  quality  of  services  to  be  provided.  They 
formulate the relevant strategic plans, sectoral policies, and control mechanisms or laws 
and  determine  the  level  of  resource/budgetary  allocation.  Service  providers  deliver the 
services, professionally or otherwise, while beneficiaries assert their rights as voter-citizens 
(effectively or otherwise). Effective service delivery is most likely if all the three parties play 
their roles well. 
3.6.  The accountability framework has a variety of stakeholders with varying degrees of 
responsibilities and voice. These include the patients or service-users (who may be citizens); 
policymakers (e.g. politicians and technocrats at central and LGs); the service providers (e.g. 
medical  superintendents);  and  finally,  frontline  staff  (doctors  and  nurses).  These 
stakeholders relate to each other through: client power, compacts, management and voice. 
Figure 1 depicts the direction and strengths of the relationships in an ideal situation, while 
Figure 2 illustrates the “real world” situation with reference to the flow of medicines in 
Uganda. The shift from Figure 1 to Figure 2 signifies a shift from the conceptual (or general)  
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framework to the empirical dynamics in the drug/medicines sub-sector. Figure 2 clearly 
shows that the accountability relationships between the Ugandan citizens (or service users) 
and  the  public  health  providers  are  weak.  The ‘voices’  of  the  citizen vis-à-vis the  local 
government and central government officials are also weak. These ‘weak links’ as will be 
discussed later need to be strengthened. 
Figure 1: Ideal Accountability Relationships in Public Service Delivery 
Voice-politics (between citizens and the state) 
Compact (between the state and producers) 
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Data and Methods 
3.7.  The research methodology was primarily based on qualitative work but also drew on 
secondary sources for quantitative data, where applicable. It also combined desk based 
literature  review  including  review  of  policy  documents  and  field  visits  in  five  sampled 
districts of Apac, Hoima, Kamuli, Mubende and Rukungiri. Three of these districts were 
covered in the study commissioned by the World Bank entitled “Human Development Pillar 
of the PEAP: Opportunities and Challenges
1”. The study comprised key stages but closely 
interlinked.  
3.8.  A comprehensive review of the readily available literature as well as the Government 
of Uganda (GoU) Acts and policy documents related to delivery of medicines was carried 
out. Critical analysis of the institutional partnerships crafted between different stakeholders 
(e.g. NMS and third parties; central agencies, LGs and NGOs) was conducted. The aim was to 
establish  whether  or  not  these  partnerships  are  viable  for  improved  medicine  service 
delivery. In-depth interviews were conducted with top health sector officials as well as the 
middle-level institutions and officials.  
3.9.  Field visits were then carried out and in-depth interviews conducted with government 
and  non-governmental  units  responsible  for  the  management  of  medicines  at  different 
health units – the regional referral hospitals, district hospitals and health centres ranging 
from HC IV down to HC II. The status of health infrastructure as it relates to drug delivery 
was documented. A contrast was then made between the improved health infrastructure 
and the level of drug availability, the number of professional health workers in the health 
facilities  and  the  level  of  “tooling”.  The  conduct  of  health  workers  (professional  or 
unprofessional)  was  also  investigated  via  field  observations  and  FGDs  with  service 
beneficiaries.  FGDs  and  interviews  with  community  leaders  were  also  carried  out  to 
establish the degree to which local communities hold elected politicians as well as technical 
service  providers  to  account  for  the  level  of  drug  delivery  (whether  satisfactory  or 
unsatisfactory). 
3.10.  Within the national and local governance structures of health services, the 
challenges faced by NMS in drug procurement and disbursement were investigated; the 
delivery  of  drugs  (in money  terms)  from  the  national  level  to  the  DHO  and  HSDs  was 
tracked.  From  the  DHO  to  the  lower-level  health  units,  an  assessment  was  done  (via 
interviews, field observations, and critical analyses of records) on the degree to which the 
credit  line  medicines  delivered  by  NMS  and  received  by  the  DHO  reach  the  intended 
beneficiaries in a timely manner. The focus was on the last three disbursements during May 
2008 to April 2009. A similar approach was followed for medicines under PHC. However, the 
reference period was on medicines procured from July 2008 to March 2009 (FY2008/09). 
Analyses  of the  health-related auxiliary  infrastructure  (e.g.  the  local  road  networks, the 
tooling of the DHO, and the telephone and IT penetration rates) were done to contextualize 
the challenges of drug delivery within the districts and HSDs. Finally, FGDs, field interviews 
and observations were used to assess the role of the HUMCs and NGOs especially faith-
based in the delivery of medicines. 
                                                
1. This study was commissioned to EPRC by the World Bank Uganda Country Office.   
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3.11.   To  gain  further  insights  into  the  drug  delivery  mechanisms,  a  total  of 10 
government  health  facilities (see  Appendix  1) were  randomly  selected in  each  sampled 
district. A public district hospital was also selected in addition to the government health 
facilities. Health facilities were selected by stratifying the health care system to select a mix 
of urban, peri-urban and rural facilities. A total of 50 in-charges were interviewed, one per 
health facility, giving a total of 45 in-charges from the health centres and 5 from the referral 
and district hospitals. 
3.12.   The  field  instruments  (see  Appendix  A)  included  among  other  things 
structured questionnaires administered at the district and service delivery points (hospitals 
and lower health facilities). Both qualitative and quantitative information were collected. 
The  information  gathered  included:  management,  distribution  and  supply of  medicines; 
supervision; utilisation of PHC funds; delivery of consignments to the facilities; and stock 
handling  in  the  facility  stores  and  training  among  others.    A  number  of  quantitative 
indicators were also applied to collect information on consumption of essential medicines, 





4.   Institutional Partnerships in the Delivery of Medicines 
4.1.  This chapter examines the viability of the institutional partnerships forged between 
different stakeholders that are involved in the delivery of health services in general and 
medicines  in  particular.  Inspiration  is  drawn  from  the  recent  studies  that  have 
demonstrated  that  ‘institutions  matter’  (Chang,  2002;  2007).  That,  institutions  play  a 
fundamental role in determining the level of economic development is no longer debatable. 
That cross-national differences in public services are shaped by the quality of institutions is 
not debatable either (Kiiza, 2007). What is worth documenting here is the link between 
institutional partnerships and the delivery of medicines in Uganda. 
4.2.   In the sections that follow, the meaning of institutions is outlined. Then the health 
sector institutions in Uganda contextualised. In the third section, Uganda’s health system is 
described. In the fourth section, the dominant role of the public sector in the provision of 
health services is noted. The fifth section zeroes down to the most important concern of this 
chapter:  the  importance  of  public/private  partnerships.  In the  sixth  section,  the  sector-
specific partnerships that impact the delivery of medicines in Uganda are documented. The 
final section makes concluding remarks. 
Meaning of Institutions 
4.3.   The research team’s conceptualization of institutions shows no desire, on their part, to 
reinvent the wheel. The widely accepted definition of institutions as the formal and the 
informal ‘rules of the game’, laws and regularized patterns of behaviour that determine 
outcomes  in  an  ‘organizational’  setting  was  adopted  (Van  Arkadie,  1990).  The  idea  of 
‘organization’ with reference to (a) the health system that delivers medicines, efficiently or 
otherwise; and (b) the concrete institutions or organizations that are involved – such as 
MoH, NMS and JMS is used. It is appreciated that some institutions are formal (such as NDA) 
while others are informal – for example the trust put in Ms Elizabeth Iripo (In-Charge of 
Butoloogo HC II, Mubende) by the community that benefits from her patriotic service and 
dedication. The focus in this study is on the formal institutions. The research team argue 
that  collaborative  institutional  partnerships  are  important  in  a  complex  sector  such  as 
health where a multiplicity of institutional actors exist.  
Uganda’s Institutional Actors in Context 
4.4.  Uganda’s  health  sector  has  different  institutional  actors,  including  the  public,  the 
private, the NGOs, and the community-based initiatives. The rise of these different actors 
needs to be understood in context. In the pre-colonial era, traditional health practitioners 
(such  as  local  herbalists  and  Traditional  Birth  Attendants  (TBAs)  were  the  main  health 
service providers. The advent of colonialism in the late 19
th Century saw the rise of (a) faith-
based  hospitals  and  (b) public  health  facilities.  Organized  at  the  national,  regional  and 
community levels, both the missionary and the public health systems advocated a more 
modern or ‘professional’ approach to the delivery of medicines. Many were hostile to the 
traditional health practitioners  who were  labelled  ‘pagan’  (read  ‘unchristian’).  However, 
neither  the  faith-based  nor  the  public  health  providers  succeeded  in  uprooting  the 
traditional herbalists. The reason, it would seem, is because the herbalists mastered the art 
of psychology. Herbalists also charged affordable rates and were readily accessible to the 
community.   
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4.5.  Over the last few decades, policymakers in Africa have upgraded traditional herbalists 
from unwanted ‘pagans’ to ‘complementary’ medical practitioners. However, interviewees 
reported  that  government  typically  finds  it  difficult  to  distinguish  between  genuine 
traditional healers from the bicupuli (or fake) herbalists. Press reports suggest that bicupuli 
herbalists exploit their patients psychologically, financially, or even sexually as in situations 
where  male  herbalists  rape  their  female  ‘clients’.  Some  traditional  healers  advise  their 
clients against modern laboratory tests in preference for herbal concoctions. However, this 
practice  is  also  reported  among  modern  ‘pastors’  of  the  Pentecostal  Christian  Revival 
Movement. 
The Health System in Present-Day Uganda 
4.6.  The  health  system  in  Uganda  is  operated  on  a  six  tier  infrastructure  of  service 
provision, including the national referral hospitals (Mulago and Butabika); the regional and 
district referral hospitals; the HCs (II-IV); and the community-based initiatives commonly 
known as the alternative medical practitioners. Across this health system, one finds four 
distinctive categories of institutional actors – the public, the private or for-profit actors, the 
faith-based or NGOs, and, the ‘alternative’ medical practitioners (such as the TBAs) who 
complement  but  often  complicate  the  formal  health  delivery  mechanism.  These  actors 
operate  under  the  policy  and  institutional  framework  set  by  the  line  MoH  under  the 
relevant laws and the associated health sector strategic plans.  
4.7.  Other  important  institutional  actors  (see  Figure  3)  are:  The  MoFPED  (which  is 
responsible for health financing); the donors, who play an extremely important role in the 
health sector
2, and QCIL. This company owns an ultramodern factory in Luzira. The factory 
was  a  product  of  a  partnership  that  the  company  recently  forged  with  GoU  (which 
contributed the land for factory premises) and the Indian pharmaceutical giant CIPLA (which 
agreed to transfer manufacturing technology to Uganda). The factory produces ARVs and 
ACTs, which MoH purchases for distribution through NMS. One strategic importance of the 
company is the transfer of technology from CIPLA to QCIL. This would, in the long run be 
beneficial  to  Uganda  as  the  country  would  become  the  regional  hub  as  regards  the 
production and distribution of ARVs and ACTs. 
Important Role of the Public Sector 
4.8.  It is worth noting that up until the 1980s, the public sector has been the major provider 
of  health  and  other  public  services  in  Uganda.  By  public  sector  is  meant  the  central 
government  departments  (such  as  MoH);  inter-governmental  agencies  (such  as  WHO); 
statutory agencies (such as NMS); national health institutions (such as Mulago); and local 
government authorities (such as the DHO). The public sector became a dominant player 
because of its constitutional mandate to operate at the national, international, regional and 
community levels. The last two decades, however, have been associated with the erosion of 
the  public  state  sector.  This  erosion  is  associated  with  the  wide-ranging  economic  and 
institutional reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (Kiiza, 2006). The claim was that provision of 
public  services  suffered  important  problems  of  resource  scarcity,  weak  managerial 
expertise, and weak incentives for public bureaucrats (who work in the non-market sector) 
to provide goods and services efficiently, effectively and sustainably. 
                                                
2 . At the time of undertaking the study, donors’ budget support to national budget was about 30 percent. Additionally, all ARVs and 






















Source: Adapted from Kiiza, et al, 2006 
Notes: 
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4.9.   Figure 3 shows the key institutional players in the drug delivery in Uganda. Some of the 
players  are  institutions  directly  under  the  MoH  (e.g.  hospitals,  national  level  health 
institutions, and district level health institutions), others are donors, and yet others play a 
facilitative role in the delivery of medicines (e.g. MoFPED, Parliament). Missing in Figure 3 
are private sector institutions including JMS and Private Not-For Profit (PNFPs). Facilitating 
institutions, which include the MoFPED and Parliament, appropriate the public budget for 
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the health sector. Parliament also exercises an oversight function particularly through its 
committee on social services.   
4.10.   Less ideologically driven researchers acknowledge the challenges of the public 
sector (such as limited financing). They contend, however, that the private sector, too, has 
fundamental challenges. For one thing, the private sector in Uganda is still embryonic and, 
therefore, insignificant. Second, it is driven by the profit motive, not public service. Third, 
private health institutions are predominantly in the urban centres (where a market for their 
products  exists).  They  are  largely  inaccessible  to  the  rural  dwellers  -  the  majority  of 
Uganda’s population. Official statistics indicate that over 80 percent of Ugandans live in the 
rural areas primarily as smallholder agriculturalists. In such an agrarian economy, private 
provision of health may lead to the exclusion of the rural and the urban poor. 
The Rise of Public-Private Partnerships 
4.11.  The realization that both the public and the private sectors suffer important 
constraints  has  given  credence  to  public–private  partnerships  (PPPs)  as  important 
institutional innovations. Partnership exist where there is mutual trust, backed by a guiding 
policy framework; shared norms and values; common goals or pursuits; a code of conduct; 
and a general agreement on the rules of engagement. According to North (1990) and Nkya 
(2000),  partnerships  are  institutional  arrangements  that  constitute  rules  defining  the 
relationships,  roles,  responsibilities  and  accountability  mechanisms  (both  formal  and 
implied) of different collaborating actors. The overriding goal of PPPs is to meet public 
needs that would have been difficult to realize without collaborative efforts.  
4.12.   The literature on PPPs suffers one important problem, namely, the failure to 
clearly spell out what constitutes the private as opposed to the public in the public–private 
partnerships.  An  influential  World  Bank  study  conducted  by  Marek  (2003)  argues  that 
‘private sector providers are understood as any service providers who are not from the public 
sector.  In  particular,  they  include  private  for-profit  providers,  traditional  healers,  NGOs, 
community groups and informal drug vendors’. This is an important conceptual mistake. 
Private  sector  actors  are  those,  and  only  those,  that  are  driven  by  the  goal  of  profit 
maximization. Traditional healers, NGOs and community-based actors are not part of the 
private sector. The aforementioned conceptual errors have fuelled the popular but flawed 
categorization of health providers into the public providers, the private for-profits and the 
so-called private-not-for profits (PNFPs).  
4.13.   The point of departure by the research team is that the public, the private and 
faith-based health providers all serve the public, in the true sense of the word. Thus, the 
simplistic question of whether a service provider is ‘public’ or ‘private’ is avoided. Instead, 
the partnerships forged and whether they are effective or ineffective in meeting public 
needs are examined. In the complex health sector, a useful way of distinguishing between 
the  different  actors  is  to  investigate  their  sources  of  funding  and  their  accountability 
relationships  with  the  service  users.  Public  health  providers  use  public  finance,  public 
employees and public facilities to provide health as a public service, that is, in the interest of 
the public, defined as the taxpayer or the voter-citizen. Public health providers are also 
answerable to the public (for example through the District Councils that are responsible for 
monitoring service delivery in Uganda’s local governments). Private-for-profits use private 
capital and are accountable to both shareholders and clients. Faith-based practitioners get  
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funds  from  charities  and  are  answerable  to  God  and  humanity.  However,  faith-based 
hospitals such as Nyakibaale in Rukungiri district receive grants from the GoU. Interviewees, 
however, suggested that no strict mechanisms exist to hold faith-based hospitals to account 
for the funds they receive. Fortunately, service users predominantly have a positive rating of 
faith-based hospitals vis-à-vis public health facilities.  
4.14.   Regarding the PNFPs, important controversies exist. Influential studies have 
categorized the faith-based hospitals (such as Lubaga Hospital in Kamuli and Nyakibale in 
Rukungiri  or  even  Kitovu  Hospital in  Masaka) as  PNFPs.  Interviews  with  these  hospitals 
suggest that they are definitely not private companies. Nor are they necessarily not-for-
profits. A health worker at Lubaga Hospital in Kamuli district stated as follows: 
Much as profit-making is not our primary goal, we would not be hurt if we made some profits for ploughing 
back into the health system. This would enable us to improve the quality of our services to God’s people. The 
problem is that medicines and equipment are expensive. And we charge below-market rates for our services 
and medicines. Our community has lots of poor people who would be excluded if we charged commercial rates. 
Luckily, we get funding not just from user-fees (which are below market rates) but also from Government. We 
have an unwritten partnership with the community (which pays user-fees) and with Government, which gives 
us funds. Government funding has been very helpful. But we would be appreciative if Government started 
paying the salaries of our employees as well (Interviews, Lubaga Hospital, Kamuli, March 2, 2009). 
 
4.15.   The clearest definition of faith-based health providers, and the incentives that 
drive them, was perhaps given by a senior official of St Joseph’s, Madudu HC III in Mubende 
(see Box 1). This is a faith-based, Catholic-owned health facility. 
Box 1: – Understanding the Motivators of Faith-Based Health Service Providers 
 
Historically, we are missionaries. Our calling is to preach the Gospel of the Good Lord in whatever we do, say 
or plan. The Church historically ventured into health and education services because we understood these to 
be central  to  holistic  service  to  God  and  humanity.  It  was  realized  that  the  Gospel  we  preach  would  be 
incomplete unless we helped God’s people get released from bondage to ignorance, disease and sickness. 
These seriously affect the day-to-day lives of God’s people. Our gospel about the loving God becomes more 
meaningful if we relate it to the challenges that God’s people face in their day-to-day lives. 
 
It is worth emphasizing that ours is missionary work. We are driven by the religious norm of service beyond 
self. We are also guided by the norm of total obedience. For that matter, there are no hard-to reach areas for 
us. When our leaders post us in what you are calling ‘hard-to-reach-areas,’ we go without question. We obey 
because we see that as God’s calling upon us to serve His people, wherever they may be. Of course we are 
human and often face great challenges. However, we are socialized to serve beyond self. Whatever we cannot 
endure, we tolerate. Whatever we cannot tolerate, we endure (Interview with Senior Official, Madudu HC III in 





Sector-Specific Partnerships that Impact Delivery of Medicines 
4.16.   In this subsection, the sector-specific partnerships that impact the delivery of 
medicines in Uganda are examined. Particular interest is made in the partnerships for health 
financing; for the local manufacture of medicines; and for drug distribution and use. The 
collaboration between government and faith-based NGOs; the partnership between NMS 
and the DHO; the LG health infrastructure (that is, the DHO, HSD and lower health centres); 
the  role  of  HUMCs;  and  the  role  of  laboratories  and  rapid  diagnostic  tests  (RDTs)  in 
overcoming drug stock outs and drug abuse are highlighted. But first, the rules of the game 
that contextualize the partnerships are highlighted. 
a)  On the Rules of the Game 
4.17.   Binding ‘rules of the game’ are needed to ensure predictable behaviour. The 
rules and regulations; the laws and bylaws; and the guidelines that regulate the health 
sector are set by Parliament (via the Acts of Parliament) and other relevant bodies (such as 
District Councils that make district ordinances). Article 169 of the Constitution established 
the Health Service Commission (HSC), which has powers (under Article 170(1b) to appoint 
health workers and confirm, discipline or remove them from office. The Commission is also 
mandated  to  review  the  health  workers’  terms  and  conditions  of  service,  the  standing 
orders and the workers’ welfare with a view to making recommendations to government 
(Article 170(1c). 
4.18.   The field findings indicate that health workers in Uganda operate under de-
motivating terms and conditions of service. A fresh medical officer in public health facilities, 
for example, earns less than Ushs800,000 per month (or US$400). Medical officers and 
clinicians overwhelmingly argue that no doctor can be effective without nurses. Yet the 
nurses and midwives earn only about Ushs350,000 (or US$ 175) per month. Many of the 
health workers who are trained on Ugandan taxpayers’ money are migrating to Rwanda 
where they are paid substantially higher rates. The HSC and other relevant health-sector 
institutions need to address the plight of Ugandan medical professionals. This is important 
for motivating health workers, boosting the retention and staffing levels, and improving the 
delivery of medicines to service users. 
4.19.   The Health Service Act, 2001 (under Part IV) spells out the Code of Conduct 
for all health workers in Uganda. Under Section 30 of this Act, a health worker is obliged to 
take the health, safety and interest of patients to be of paramount importance at all times 
and  in  all  circumstances,  and  to  ensure  that  no  health  worker’s  action  or  omission  is 
detrimental to the patient. Section 30(7) makes it illegal for a health worker to ask for, or 
accept,  a bribe;  while  Section 30(9) provides  that  a health  worker  shall not  abandon a 
patient under his or her care. 
4.20.   The National Drug Policy and Authority Act (CAP 206) spells out Uganda’s drug 
policy and establishes the NDA. Under Section 5 of the Act, the NDA is, among other things, 
charged with the following duties: 
￿  Licensing and regulation of the pharmacies in the country; 
￿  Licensing of health clinics that dispense medicines  
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￿  Approval of the national list of essential drugs, which may be reviewed from time to 
time, as need  arises.  [The  list is  prepared by the  Committee  on Essential Drugs 
(Section 6)]; 
￿  Controlling the quality of drugs, which includes the importation, exportation, and 
sale of pharmaceuticals; 
￿  Promoting local production of medicines; and 
￿  Promoting the rational use of drugs through appropriate professional training. 
4.21.    The  NDA  raises  funds  for  its  activities  mainly  through  licences  and  fees. 
Inadequate funding of the NDA was identified as a bottleneck to meeting its mandate. 
Established as a public enterprise, the NDA has no budget allocation for operations from 
government, yet the amount of money it collects in form of fees and licences is inadequate 
when it comes to enabling it to meet its mandate. Accordingly, inadequate inspection of 
clinics and hospitals to ensure that medicines being dispensed are not expired is one major 
challenge the NDA is facing. 
b)  Partnerships for Health-sector Financing 
4.22.   The  financing  of  medicines  in  Uganda  is  done  under  three  institutional 
arrangements – the credit line; PHC, and third party arrangements. Credit-line funds are 
released from the MoFPED to NMS through the line MoH. Officials from NMS and MoH 
(whom  were  interviewed)  reported  that  the  current  flow  of  funds  for  medicines  has 
important in-built inefficiencies. The MoFPED releases funds to MoH, which advises NMS 
how much credit NMS has with MoH for procurement of drugs. Guided by the budget ceiling 
(and the needs of clients), the NMS, then, procures medicines from suppliers on credit. 
Study respondents reported that NMS is financially constrained. In addition to procurement, 
the NMS manages the storage, packaging and distribution of medicines to the districts. The 
NMS  then  picks  the  delivery  notes  and  presents  invoices  to  MoH  for  reimbursements. 
Interviewees  at  NMS  reported  that  1-3  months  typically  elapse  before  NMS  receives 
payment. According to a key informant interviewee, ‘The PPDA [The Republic of Uganda’s 
The Public Procurement and Disposal of Assets, 2003] rules legislate that we shall receive 
payment after the delivery of medicines. While the PPDA rules were well intentioned, they 
constrain our functionality. The rules were premised on the highly optimistic assumption that 
NMS is highly capitalized. This is not the case. Second, our trucks used to deliver medicines 
once in two months, as stipulated in the law. Now we deliver monthly. But we are being 
constrained by persistent delays by MoH officials to honour our invoices’ (NMS Interviews, 
May 2009). 
4.23.   The second major institutional arrangement for financing medicines is PHC. 
The PHC funds are decentralized to districts (to supplement NMS’s procurement efforts). 
According  to  MoH  and  MoFPED,  the  principle  aim  of  the  PHC  funds  was  to  increase 
availability of essential health system inputs particularly vaccines, drugs, human resources, 
medical equipment and health infrastructure. The PHC funds are disbursed directly from 
MoFPED under the votes for conditional transfers or grants to (a) the DHOs; (b) district 
hospitals; and (c) NGO hospitals. The MoH guidelines to the DHOs/Medical Superintendants 
(MSs) on the procurement of medicines state the following: 
￿  Fifty percent of PHC funds received by a district must be spent on procurement of 
medicine, and the other 50 percent on general management of health facilities. The 
district hospitals are expected to spend 40 percent of the PHC funds on medicines;  
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￿  All credit line medicines must be procured from NMS on credit, upon placement of 
an  order  for  medicines  by  the  district  (DHO)  for  specific  health  facilities  in  the 
district; and 
￿  Regarding the procurement of PHC drugs, the first point of call is NMS. If NMS is not 
able to meet the request, NMS shall give a “certificate of non-availability” to the 
DHO, which empowers the DHO to try the second point of call – the JMS. In case JMS 
cannot  meet  the  request,  the  DHO  is  then  free  to  purchase  the  medicines  in 
question from any registered private pharmacy. 
 
4.24.   The MSs, who are the vote controllers of the district hospitals, manage the 
PHC  transfers.  While transfers  to  the  district  health  offices  are managed  by the  DHOs, 
medical officers manage transfers to HSDs. The PHC funds are not only used to purchase 
drugs but also to carry out general administrative activities associated with management, 
infection control and health education in the district hospitals and/or health centres. There 
are government guidelines on the PHC allocations across the components. The guidelines 
were introduced to improve the efficiency of financial resources. However, the accounting 
officers have taken the guidelines as an incentive to abuse the PHC funds either through 
misallocations  and  misappropriations.  Put  differently,  the  PHC  allocations  are  taken  as 
guidelines but not as a condition (see detailed discussion in Chapter 4). As will be discussed 
later in Chapter 4, the fieldwork shows that districts (such as Rukungiri) that follow this 
guideline have a considerably less serious problem of drug stock outs than those (such as 
Hoima) that take the guideline as a mere guide. In other words, the accounting officers have 
taken the guideline as an incentive to abuse the PHC funds either through misallocations or 
misappropriations. A strong recommendation is made on this later. 
c)  Partnerships between Government and the Donors 
4.25.   At the time of doing research, Government and the donors were the main 
providers of funds for medicines in Uganda. This research indicates that procurement of 
drugs by the “third parties” is unpredictable and does not follow a definite calendar; it has 
no linkages with the calendar for the NMS. Uncoordinated procurement of drugs between 
NMS and “third parties” has resulted into both distribution and storage problems. The NMS 
prefers to first store and distribute “third party” medicines because of its direct payment as 
opposed to supply on credit of medicines procured by it. This incentive could partly explain 
the delays in procurement and distribution of credit line medicines. The rush for distribution 
of  “third  party”  medicines  is  sometimes  on  account  of  little  time  left  to  expiry  of  the 
medicines. For example, in July 2007, NMS rejected drugs from third parties that had only 
one month to expire. In terms of value, government contributes 20 percent of the drugs, 
which cover 50 percent of the medicines needed. By contrast, in value terms, the “third 
parties” contribute 80 percent of drugs. At the time of research, donors were the main 
funders  of  anti-malarials  (mainly  coartem)  and  ARVs  –  all  expensive  drugs.  This 
overdependence on foreign sources to finance the health sector is dangerous.  
4.26.   In fact, the fieldwork established that the problem of drug stock outs was 
more serious for donor-funded medicines (especially coartem) and less common for those 
procured by NMS. The suspension of the Global Fund partly impacted on the supply of anti-
malarials. The high dependence on donors as regards the procurement and distribution of 
medicines  has  overarching  implications  on  the  country’s  health  system.  First,  donor 
interventions do not necessarily target Uganda’s unmet health needs. Second, many of the  
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donor agencies operating in health and other sectors do not want to be coordinated. They 
typically decide, independent of Central or Local Governments, which part of the country to 
cover with their medical interventions. [Some donors have even refused to be part of the 
Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS)]. Thus, certain parts of the country (particularly the 
lakeshore regions and other hard-to-reach areas) tend to be under-covered. This suggests 
that the governance of health service delivery is highly influenced by “third parties” and to a 
lesser  extent  by  national  priorities.  The  poor  coordination  of  the  multiple  stakeholders 
operating in the health sector (central government agencies, district authorities, lower local 
governments, private sector players, NGOs and donor agencies) negatively affects service 
delivery. 
d)  Partnership between Government and Private Pharmaceutical Companies 
4.27.   The  QCIL  best  illustrates  the  working  partnership  between  the  GoU  and 
private pharmaceutical companies to manufacture medicines locally. This company is a new 
initiative  that  came  about  to  mitigate  the  negative  effects  of  trade-related  intellectual 
property rights (TRIPs) of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The TRIPS were put onto the 
agenda of the WTO by developed countries in 1995. The aim was to grant monopoly powers 
to  the  pharmaceutical  companies  (which  are  predominantly  located  in  the  developed 
countries). Those who support patents and other ‘intellectual property rights’ argue that the 
protection  of  innovators  is  necessary for  motivating  firms  to  invest  in  risky  Research & 
Development  (R&D).  Critics  argue  that  patents  prioritize  the  right  of  pharmaceutical 
companies to profit over patients’ rights to life. In other words, patents sacrifice patients’ 
right to life on the altar of corporate greed. 
4.28.   The case of QCIL makes sense in the above context. QCIL is not a pure for-
profit private company. It is a partnership between GoU, CIPLA pharmaceutical giant of 
India, and Ugandan entrepreneurs. The partnership sprung from the realization that about 
80 percent of the world’s malaria patients and roughly 60 percent of people infected or 
affected by HIV/AIDS live in Africa. Yet, less than 2 percent of the drugs are manufactured in 
Africa. This suggests that Africa has the patients; other countries produce the medicines. 
Second, CIPLA (which was established in 1935) was identified as a potential partner. The 
company manufactures generics of virtually all medicines, but its largest strength is in Anti 
Retriviral Treatment (ARTs) particularly ARVs. CIPLA typically gets samples of branded or 
patented  medicines  (old  and  new),  conducts  reverse  engineering  and  produces  new, 
cheaper  and  oftentimes  better  quality  medicines.  CIPLA  sells  its  generic  ARTs  at  one-
hundredth of the price of brands. For example, the cost of ARVs was Ushs 3 m per doze per 
month. When generics came in, the price declined to Ushs 20,000 per doze per month. By 
implication, then, CIPLA would be a great partner in Uganda’s struggle against the diseases 
of the poor. 
4.29.   Thus, in 2004 QCIL officials and GoU officials visited CIPLA. CIPLA indicated 
that it was facing a key challenge, which Uganda could use to its advantage. India had 
ratified the TRIPS. Prior to the ratification of the TRIPS, India used to patent processes. 
Under the TRIPS, India was going international and would patent molecules, etc. With effect 
from 2007, new patented molecules would not be sourced from India. Moreover, India 
would face great constraints in manufacturing generic copies of patented medicines. But, 
under  the  flexibilities  that  were  built  into  the  TRIPS,  Indian  pharmaceutical  companies 
would be permitted to transfer technology to developing countries (such as Rwanda and  
 
21
Tanzania).  [These  actually  tried  to  outsmart  Uganda  in  attracting  CIPLA.  Rwanda  was 
offering US$50m to have the CIPLA plant in Rwanda; while Tanzania wanted to provide all 
the money needed using NSSF money. But CIPLA decided to partner with Uganda]. 
4.30.   According to a senior official of QCIL, GoU played a key role in causing the 
partnership to  materialize.  A  small local company  like QCIL ‘would not have  succeeded 
without  strong  government  support’  (Interviews,  11  June  2009).  The  government 
contributed 20 percent of the initial capital. It donated land where the Luzira factory is 
located. Government also guaranteed a market for the pharmaceuticals manufactured by 
QCIL (such as the ARVs). The absence of effective development banks in Uganda at the time 
caused QCIL to borrow from Barclays Bank at the high/commercial interest rates of 8-9 
percent on the dollarized loans. [Today, 16 percent of QCIL out-turn goes to repay loans. 
The company pays US$5.5m a year for the principle plus interest]. However, government 
gave a 7-year take-off guarantee, that is, the period of paying back the loans that QCIL 
obtained from the bank (QCIL Interviews, 11 June 2009].  
4.31.   The contribution of CIPLA to the partnership is also substantial. The company 
transferred intrinsic technology, that is, the knowledge of how to manufacture drugs (i.e. 
the  molecules).  CIPLA  brought  in  engineers/technicians  who  built  the  state-of-the  art 
factory  at  Luzira.  The  plant  was  designed  to  meet  the  latest  world  standards.  Initially, 
expatriates  were  imported  to  do  the  technical  work.  Later  on,  CIPLA  established  that 
Uganda has well-trained mechanical and electrical engineers, biochemists, pharmacists, and 
other skills. The number of expatriates has been cut from about 40 to 12 (who are now 
training Ugandans). The complex infrastructure at Luzira cost US$32m but CIPLA’s most 
important contribution to Uganda was the formula to make drugs, which would probably 
cost US$100m. By giving Uganda the state-of-the art Luzira factory (which is one of its kind 
in sub-Saharan Africa), CIPLA is giving Uganda an immense opportunity. The Luzira factory 
would become a hub for the African region. Within the next two years, it will bring in about 
US$200m in foreign exchange earnings from the sales to Tanzania (estimated at US$45m); 
Sudan (US$45m) Kenya (US$45m), DRC (US$40m), Rwanda (US$15m); Burundi (US$10m). 
Over this period, the sales in Uganda might total US$30m (QCIL Interviews, 11 June 2009].  
e)  Partnerships between Government and Faith-Based NGOs 
4.32.   Another important form of collaboration in the delivery of medicines is the 
Government/NGO  partnership.  The  field  findings  established  that  government/NGO 
partnerships are  collaborative  in some cases and parasitic  in  others. In Kamuli  (Lubaga 
Hospital), the partnership is collaborative. [Between 2006 and 2008, government was the 
main source of grants to Lubaga Hospital. These grants exceeded the money raised by the 
hospital via user fees]. In other cases (such as Madudu HC III in Mubende district), the sorry 
state of government health facilities forced service users to flock to the faith-based health 
facilities, which end up being overloaded. A similar situation was reported at Kyangwali HC 
III where the German NGO called Action Africa Hilfe (AAH) runs a more effective health 
facility than the government HC III in the vicinity. AAH top ups allowances for public health 
workers at the Kyangwali HC III. The only ambulance that serves both the NGO health facility 
and  the  public  HC  III  is  also  provided  by  AAH.  This  has  had  one  negative  effect.  Exit 
interviewees have the perception that foreign NGOs care, Ugandan government does not. 
Press  reports  suggest  that  people  in  Northern  Uganda  predominantly  have  a  similar 
negative perception of the government. This needs to be corrected.  
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4.33.   The partnership between government and NGOs appears to have  reached 
interesting proportions in Rukungiri. In this area, no government hospital exists at district 
level. The government literally off-loaded its responsibilities to two faith-based hospitals – 
Nyakibale Hospital (under the UCMB) and Kisiizi Hospital (under the UPMB). These faith-
based hospitals receive government grants and are perceived to be in partnership with 
government. Indeed, they have done a lot for government in terms of doing clinical work 
and training nurses for public health facilities. 
4.34.   Interviewees  reported  that  faith-based  hospitals  closely  supervise  their 
employees  and  typically  attain  more  health  deliverables  than  their  counterparts  in 
government health facilities. It was reported that nurses/midwives in faith-based hospitals 
each  earn  a monthly  salary of  about  Ushs250,000  compared to about  Ushs350,000  for 
public sector nurses/midwives. But because of strict supervision, those in faith-based NGO 
health facilities are more productive. Study participants reported two key challenges. First, 
the faith-based hospitals tend to focus on financially rewarding activities – such as clinical 
work, thanks to the importance of user-fees. This leads to the neglect of primary health 
education  and  outreach  activities,  which  are  less  financially  rewarding.  Second  is  the 
problem  of  user-fees.  While  faith-based  health  facilities  charge  subsidized  rates  (e.g. 
Ushs20,000 for normal delivery), sections of the local population cannot afford to pay. An 
FGD participant at Nyakibale Hospital argued that ‘the absence of a government hospital at 
district level has denied us the free medical services, which Ugandans in other parts of the 
country ordinarily enjoy’ (Interviews, 2009). The evidence in Rukungiri district leads to one 
key recommendation. Government needs to upgrade at least one of its HC IVs into a district 
hospital.  
f)  The Local Government Health Infrastructure  
4.35.   The field observations and critical review of documents indicate that a dense 
health infrastructure exists at local government level. The local level institutions that play 
key  roles  in  the  acquisition,  distribution  and  utilization  of  medicines  include  the  Chief 
Administrative  Office  (CAO);  the  DHO,  the  HSD  Medical  Officer;  the  regional  referral 
hospitals (which are self accounting units); all health facilities (ranging from district hospitals 
and the HC IVs to HC IIs); and the HUMC. 
  i) Role of the CAO 
4.36.   The CAO is the accounting officer for all district financial resources, whether 
they  are  raised  locally  or  disbursed  from  the  central  government  under  Uganda’s 
decentralization policy. The health budget is controlled by the CAO. All expenditures must 
be approved by the CAO. Moreover, payments to suppliers for all district supplies (including 
medical supplies) are made under the CAO’s signature. Additionally, the CAO manages the 
district-specific technical teams (such as health professionals). The health budget at the 
district is, therefore, part of the district budget for decentralized functions. While the CAOs 
had clear understanding of the provided framework for the procurement of medicines and 
management of the health systems, some lacked full understanding of the reality on the 





  ii) Role of the DHO 
4.37.   The DHO is the administrative head of health services in the district (with 
exception of a regional referral hospital, where it exists). The DHO takes major decisions on 
the management of the district health budget and reports to the CAO. The DHO receives 
financial releases for PHC from MoFPED for both medicines and operation expenses for all 
health units in a district. The CAO manages the funds while the DHO plans for utilization of 
the funds. Regarding the budget for credit line medicine, the DHO receives communication 
from  the MoH  and/or NMS  on  the money  available,  after  which he/she  decides  on  its 
utilization in collaboration with the district health team (DHT). All requests for procurement 
of medicines in the district are approved by the DHO for onward submission to NMS in 
respect of credit line medicines, and direct purchase from JMS and other pharmacies in case 
of PHC medicine. Furthermore, the DHO ensures observance of MoH guidelines as far as 
delivery of health services at the district level is concerned. Once the DHO has received 
supplies  of  credit  line  medicines  from  NMS,  he/she  ensures  that  the  medicines  get 
distributed to the lower level health centres either by taking the medicines there or calling 
in-charges of health facilities to collect their medicines form the district headquarters. In 
case of  PHC  medicines,  the DHO together  with  the district health team,  decide  on the 
distribution  criteria  for  the  medicines,  following  the  MoH  guidelines  in  this  respect. 
However, practices in this regard vary. A key finding as regards the Office of the DHO is 
centralisation of health delivery system at that level, the existence of lower lever health 
units notwithstanding. A big proportion of PHC operation budget is retained at that level 
ranging from 10-40 percent. Lower level health units fail to meet operation expenses such 
as car repair, payment of electricity bills and others simply because of inadequate releases 
when a portion of the resources is retained at the district level. 
  iii) Role of HSD In-charge 
4.38.   In-charges of HSDs report to the DHO. The MoH recognizes the HSDs as key 
administrative units in the delivery of health services. Each county is a health sub-district, 
with a health facility either as a hospital or HC IV. The services at a HC IV should include 
theatre services, in-patients, maternity, and Out Patient Department (OPD). The HC IV is a 
referral health facility for lower level health centres. Accordingly, a Medical Officer (MO) 
presides over a HSD. Where a hospital exists within a county, the functions of HSD are in the 
hospital. In addition to managing the HC IV or hospital, the in-charge of the HSD presides 
over all medical services in his/her county or hospital. The in-charge of a HSD coordinates 
procurement of medicines in his/her area of jurisdiction and submits orders for his/her area 
to the DHO. In addition to managing the health facility at the HSD, the MO is expected to 
undertake support supervision of health facilities in the area under his/her control. Hardly 
any MoH guidelines exist on the coordination and the procurement of credit line medicines 
by the HSD in-charge. Consequently, practices vary as will be emphasized later. Guidelines 
on the acquisition and distribution of PHC medicines were not readily available at district or 
HSD to lower level health centres. Invariably, however, the DHO (together with the HSD in-
charges) uses the broad guidelines on the use of PHC funds as a frame of reference but with 
great variability. This calls for the health sector stakeholders to consider developing clear 
guidelines  to  minimize  harmful  variations  across  different  districts.  Health  sub-districts 
retain a portion of PHC recurrent budget ostensibly to facilitate operation of the health sub-
districts.  Coupled  with  the  portion  of  resources  retained  at  the  district,  the  resources 
retained at the health sub-district further reduce operational resources for HC IIs and HC IIIs.  
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Moreover, the lower level health centres take the residual of what is left after the DHOs 
office and the health sub-districts have retained what they decide without participation of 
in-charges of lower health centre. 
 
  iv) Role of Lower Health Centres 
4.39.   Lower level health facilities (HC III and HC II) are expected to play a role in the 
acquisition and utilization of both credit line and PHC medicines. HC IIIs are sub-county level 
health facilities whose ranges of services include OPD, laboratory services, and maternity. 
Ideally, a Clinical Officer heads a HC III. HC IIs are parish-level (Muluka) health facilities 
whose services are limited to OPD. In exceptional circumstances, some HC IIs also provide 
maternity services. Rarely do HC IIs offer laboratory services but could have rapid diagnostic 
facilities for testing of malaria. The in-charges of these lower HCs report to the DHO through 
the HSD in-charge. Each facility at these two levels is expected to participate in procurement 
of medicine, through making orders for medicines in response to the burden of disease in 
specific places. The MoH has not provided guidelines on the form such participation should 
take.  Accordingly,  as  will  be  discussed  later,  practices  vary  from  district  to  district,  in 
procurement of both credit line and PHC medicine, with far-reaching consequences on the 
quality of health services received by final beneficiaries. What is clear is that the lower level 
health facilities typically play a role in the collection of medicines from the district or HSD. 
Inadequate funding, inspection, and staffing render the quality of health services at these 
levels poor. Consequently, the referral system fails to work as expected, as patients prefer 
to visit hospitals as their first point of call when they fall sick. Lower level health centres are 
poorly manned. From fieldwork it was established that most health workers in lower health 
centres report very late for work (sometimes as late as 11:00 am) and retire very early; by 
the afternoon, the health centres are closed. 
  v) Role of Health Unit Management Committees (HUMCs) 
4.40.   The HUMCs are recognized institutions that represent the “voice” of the final 
beneficiaries – at least in theory. At HC IIIs and  HC IIs, the committees serve as a link 
between the management of a health facility and the beneficiary community. They are 
expected  to  ensure  a  harmonious  relationship  between  the  health  workers  and  the 
community.  Furthermore,  members  of  the  HUMC  are  expected  to  witness  arrival  of 
medicines  and  ensure  that  the  medicines  actually  reach  the  community.  Members  of 
HUMCs do not earn a salary. They are volunteers who nevertheless draw sitting allowances 
(each member receiving between Ushs3,000 to Ushs5,000 per sitting) from PHC operational 
funds whenever they sit to deliberate on issues pertaining to their local health facilities. 
Hospitals have boards of management that play a role comparable to that of HUMCs. Field 
findings indicate wide variations in the effectiveness of HUMCs as voices of the people. 
Government needs to decide whether or not HUMCs should continue being volunteers, in 
which case not much should be expected from them. 
  vi) Role of Laboratories and Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs) 
4.41.   The  field  observations  indicate  that  Rukungiri  has  a  greater  incidence  of 
laboratories at HC IIIs and rapid diagnostic facilities than most other sampled districts. Most 
importantly, the problem of drug stock outs was less serious in the health facilities that have  
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laboratories and diagnostic kits for malaria. The stocking and subsequent abuse of drugs by 
individuals, together with the associated problem of rising resistance to medicines, were 
less serious problems where diagnostic facilities existed. By implication, then, government 
needs  to  invest  in  laboratories  and  rapid  diagnostic  kits  across  the  country.  These  are 
important and affordable investments. [For example, a microscope – which is an important 
facility in laboratories – costs less than US$300].  
 
  vii) Supports for Health Service Delivery 
4.42.   The  field  findings  have  established  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  the 
effective  delivery  of  medical  services  calls  for  substantial  investments  in  auxiliary 
infrastructure. Auxiliary infrastructure –the  supports for health service delivery  – include 
things such as staff housing; solar power; phone network coverage; the quality of roads; 
water  and  sanitation;  and  the  quality  of  schools  (for  educating  the  children  of  health 
workers).  These  play  a  key  role  in  the  attraction  and  retention  of  health  workers  in 
particular  areas.  Field  observations  indicate  that  the  hard-to-reach  areas,  which,  by 
definition, have difficulties in accessing medicines and health services in general are largely 
‘hard-to-reach’ and hard-to-live-in’ because of the poor quality of auxiliary infrastructure. 
Government needs to invest auxiliary infrastructure as a matter of urgency. 
  viii) The Health Management Information System (HMIS) 
4.43.   This system  is important in lubricating  the  partnerships. It is important in 
ensuring  that  the  different  institutions  and  officials  operating  in  the  health  sector 
communicate to one another in pursuit of a common objective –improving health service 
delivery. Evidence shows that Uganda has adopted a modern HMIS. But the system does not 
seem to be working as expected. While there is general agreement that information is a 
powerful instrument of health sector planning, a substantial proportion of health facilities 
do not complete the very basic Form 105. Anecdotal evidence suggests that some players in 
the health sector are not interested in letting the HMIS work. The tentative hypothesis is 
that the HMIS is being resisted by unscrupulous health-sector officials for fear that if the 
system works it will detect their mal-practices. This hypothesis should be refined and tested 
in  a  future  study  specifically  dedicated  to  the  understanding  of  the  obstacles  to  the 
adoption of an effective HMIS in Uganda. 
Conclusions 
4.44.   This chapter  on institutional partnerships in  the  delivery  of  medicines has 
shown that an elaborate institutional framework for delivery and distribution of medicines 
exists but institutional partnerships are weak. Weaknesses in institutional partnerships exist 
at  the  national,  district,  and  lower  level  health  institutions.  The  inherent  institutional 
weaknesses and partnerships have fundamental implications on efficiency in the delivery of 
medicines  at  all  levels  and  ultimately  on  availability  of  medicines  in lower  level  health 
centres. 
4.45.   While the reforms that were implemented in the health sector were partly 
intended to increase availability and relevancy of medicines in lower level health centres 
through  institutionalizing  a  “pull”  or  “demand”  system  for  medicines  based  on disease 
burden  in  specific  geographical  areas,  the  institutional  partnerships  have  rendered  this  
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objective hardly achievable. Malaria and HIV/AIDS related ailments were found to comprise 
the highest proportion of the country’s disease burden. But the supply and distribution of 
anti-malaria  medicines  and  ARVs,  which  are  supplied  exclusively  by  “third  parties”  or 
donors,  is  based  mainly  on  the  “push”  principle  as  opposed  to  the  “pull”  principle. 
Furthermore, the NMS that is expected to supply “essential” medicines on credit is not 
responsible for the procurement of anti-malarials and HIV/AIDS medicines that address the 
highest proportion of the country’s disease burden. The flow of medicines is, therefore, 
weak in response to the disease burden of specific geographical areas. 
4.46.   At the national level, the high dependence on donors for procurement of anti-
malarial and HIV/AIDS medicines has tended to reduce the efficiency of the NMS. Donors 
pay cash to NMS for the storage and distribution of “third party” medicines.  Once donors 
have procured medicine, the attention of NMS turns to storage and distribution of those 
medicines,  with  reduced  attention  on  the  procurement  and  distribution  of  “essential 
medicines”, which NMS is required to do on credit basis. Coordination of donors in the 
health sector was reported to be a big challenge that has rendered functionality of the 
entire health system weak. The partnerships between donors, the MoH, and NMS remain 
weak with adverse effects on the flow of medicines from the national level to the districts 
and hospitals. 
4.47.   Partnerships  between  district  and  lower  level  health  institutions  are 
extremely weak, clarity of the provided framework notwithstanding. HC II and III hardly 
know their entitlements in terms of budgets for medicines and operations. For PHC, they 
depend on what the Office of the DHO and the HSD decide to pass on to them. The HC IIs 
and IIIs are highly starved of operational funds and PHC medicines hardly flow to those 
health centres. Furthermore, there is weak inspection to ensure efficient delivery of health 
services in HC IIs and HC IIIs. 
4.48.   The  district  health  referral  system  is  hardly  functional  partly  due  to 
duplication of roles in district and lower level health centres, and also due to poor health 
services especially in HC IIs. Patients prefer to go to district hospitals as their first point of 
call, where they expect better services. Attendance at HC IIIs and HC IVs is also reasonable; 
but it is poor in most health centre IIs. Medical personnel in HC IIs first attend to their 
gardens and report for duty at about 11:00 a.m. By the afternoon, most HC IIs are closed. 
4.49.   Turning  to PPPs, they  have been  very important in  the  delivery  of  health 
services, especially through faith based health institutions. The JMS established to meet the 
demands of medicines of faith based health institutions has assisted public sector intuitions 
immensely in terms of selling to them medicines that the NMS is not able to supply. Once 
the NMS has issued a certificate of non-availability for specific medicines to a public health 
institution (usually hospitals and DHOs), the guidelines provide that the first point of call is 
the JMS. This partnership has worked well and should be promoted. In case, the JMS cannot 
supply the medicine, then a hospital or Office of the DHO is free to procure medicines from 




5.  Procurement, Disbursement and Tracking of Supplies of and Funds for Medicines 
 
5.1.  This chapter presents results and discussions on the medicines and health supplies 
budgets,  procurement,  disbursement  and  tracking  supplies  of  medicines.  The  chapter 
borrows from a review and analysis of national drug budget to strengthen the information 
gathered  during  the  field  visits.  Specifically,  practices  and  issues  in  medicines  delivery 
mechanism are discussed. An overview of the national budget for medicines is presented in 
section one. In section two, focus is made on issues of procurement, disbursement and 
tracking funds meant for medicines. Tracking is done through the system from the budget 
development stage  all  the  way  through  the final  use of funds.  The  main purpose  is  to 
determine  the  pattern  of  expenditure  allocation  and  whether  all  resources  reach  their 
intended beneficiaries.  
Overview of the National Budget Allocation for Medicines and Health Supplies 
 
5.2.  During  FY2008/09  the  national  budget  estimates  for  medicines  amounted  to 
Ushs354.8bn  (Table  1).  There  are  three  key  messages  that  emerge  out  of  the  budget 
analysis: First, GoU contributes about 30 percent while the development partners provide 
70 percent to the total medicines budget. Of the estimated budget of Ushs106.0bn about 
Ushs76.1bn is spent at the national level and Ushs14.4bn at the district level through PHC 
budget.    Mulago  National  Referral  Hospital,  takes  almost  twice  the  budget  of  the  ten 
regional referral hospitals plus Mbarara and Butabika Hospitals combined. On a positive 
note, government released nearly 99.8 percent of the budget meant for medicines. The 
releases were on time. 
5.3.   The key point to note is that medicines are distributed to health facilities through 
three modes (Chapter Three): credit line medicines, PHC medicines and third party where 
funds  are  released  to  third  parties  –  mainly  by  the  development  partners  to  purchase 
medicines. Table 1 further reveals that the budget allocation for medicines and veterinary 
supplies of Ushs76bn constitutes funds for credit line medicines. The budget for credit line 
medicines  is  expended  at  the  national  level.  It  constitutes  72  percent  of  the  GoU 
contribution  to  the  medicines  budget.  The  rest  of  the  government  contribution  to  the 
medicines budget is decentralized to districts and hospitals as PHC funds.  
5.4.  Budget estimates inform donor support to the health sector, the HSSP II and the global 
fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria. The Ushs76.4bn (Table 1) for the support to the health 
sector, is expected to supplement the credit line budget for medicines. It is important to 
note that the Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria medicines component, the medicines are 
sourced outside Uganda, yet they constitute about 43.2 percent of the entire medicines 
budget. Based on interviews with key informants, GoU has little input in the manner in 
which the medicines are procured and whatever is procured is distributed through the NMS 
and  JMS.  This  demonstrates  that  government  has  little  control  of  the  procurement 
mechanism of the major medicines and in particular the anti-malarials. 
5.5.  Second, while the NMS statute no. 12 of 1993 mandates NMS to procure and distribute 
essential medicines nationwide, it only controls and manages a small proportion of the 
budget earmarked for medicines and health supplies.   Combining estimates in Table 2 that  
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have NMS and JMS in the allocation, it is estimated that the two institutions taken together 
are responsible for the purchase and distribution of medicines worth Ushs8.972bn. This is 
about 11.8 percent of the government allocation and 2.5 percent of the overall medicines 
budget. Under the current arrangement, development partners are supposed to match the 
GoU contribution - reflected as “donor support to health sector” in Table 1. Even when this 
matched development partner contribution is considered, the NMS will control and manage 
less than 6 percent of the national budget for medicines and health supplies. By implication, 
the NMS would seem more as a distributor rather than a procurement and distribution 
entity as envisaged in the NMS 1993 statute. 
 
Table 1: National Budget Estimates on Medicines, FY2008/09 
Source of funding  US$ 
*  Ushs (bn)  Percent 
Government allocation       
Medicines and veterinary supplies        76.143   21.5 
Primary Health Care**        14.355   4.0 
Mulago Complex          9.990   2.8 
Butabika          1.002   0.3 
Regional Referral Hospitals          4.551   1.3 
Sub-total (A)    106.041  29.9 
       
Development Partners       
Donor Support to Health Sector      38,183,500       76.367   21.5 
Health Sector Support Program II        9,467,200       18.934   5.3 
Global Fund for AIDS, TB & Malaria      76,706,400     153.413   43.2 
Sub-total (B)    248.714  70.1 
       
Total (A + B)      354.755   100.0 
Source: MoFPED, MTEF (2008/09) 
Notes: * US$ =2000Ushs;  
 **Primary Health Care Budget – 40-50 percent; PHC medicines referrals to lower health facilities at district level. 
 
5.6.  Third,  worth  noting  is  the  government  initiative  to  promote  large-scale  local 
manufacturing  of  medicines  as  presented  in  Table  2.  This  initiative  is  meant  to  have 
sustainability of medicines supply in the country. And it takes about 79 percent of the GoU 
budget allocation for medicines channelled to the QCIL for anti-malarials and ARVs.  
Table 2: Budget Allocations of the Funds for Medicines and Health Supplies, FY2008/09 
Description   Allocation (Ushs, Bn)     Percent  
ACTS & ARVs (QCIL)  60.000  79.0 
Essential drugs (NMS/JMS)                 6.472   8.5 
Vaccines (Immunization - UNICEF)                 5.000   6.6 
Pentavalent (UNICEF)                 2.000   2.6 
Reproductive Health Supplies [NMS/UNFPA]                 2.400   3.2 
Rabies vaccines [NMS/JMS]  0.100   0.1 
 Total   75.972    100.0 




Procurement, Disbursement and Tracking 
 
5.7.   While the framework for procurement, disbursement and acquisition of medicines and 
health supplies by public health facility level is fairly well defined, practices vary from district 
to district. This sub-section outlines and discusses practices and issues that were identified 
in field visits in the five sampled districts and links the same to the quality of health services. 
The  discussion  looks  at  credit  line  medicines  separately  from  PHC  medicines  as  the 
processes in each respect differ. 
a) Credit Line Medicines 
i) Tracking flow of funds 
 
5.8.   As already alluded to, credit line medicines are meant for essential drugs. Again, it is 
credit line because hospitals and districts do not receive cash but have credit upon which 
they can order for medicine. The MoFPED channels the credit line funds through the MoH, 
on a timely basis.  Table 3 shows the funds that were committed for the supply of credit line 
medicines and health supplies between May 2008 to April 2009 to districts and hospitals. By 
April 2009, NMS had supplied drugs and health supplies worth Ushs11.6bn, representing 
85.8 percent of the total commitment from the MoH. By implication, 14.2 percent of the 
committed funds were unspent on time as expected. However, it was not clear whether the 
remaining  balance  from  the  three  cycles  would  be  supplied  in  addition  to  new 
commitments. These delays introduce inefficiencies in the system as discussed in details 
later. 
Table 3: Committed Funds to NMS by MoH, May 2008 to April 2009 
Period   Amount, Ushs 
January -April, 2009  4,135,005,495 
September - December, 2008  4,170,964,842 
May-August, 2008  5,222,682,081 
Total   13,528,652,418 
Source: MoH, Administrative data sources 
Notes: The funds are for supply of medicines and health supplies under credit line  
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5.9.  Next the disaggregated analysis at lower levels is considered. With the exception of 
Mulago and Butabika national referral hospitals, Uganda has 11 regional referral hospitals, 
which  are  semi-autonomous.  At  national  level,  the  share  of  unsupplied  medicines  and 
health supplies vary according to facility level: regional referral hospitals registered 24.9 
percent,  30.4  percent  for  district  hospitals  and  7.3  percent  for  districts  (Table  4).  Put 
differently, the highest contribution of unsupplied medicines comes from district hospitals 
and least with district lowers health facilities. How does this picture portray itself in the 
sampled districts and health facilities therein?  
a. Referral hospitals 
5.10.   Considering  the  three  cycles  (Table  3),  Hoima  Regional  Referral  Hospital 
received medicines  worth 77.5 percent  of its  expected  commitment. The picture  is not 
different for the other regional referral hospitals (Table 4).  
b. District hospitals 
5.11.   Relative  to  referral  hospitals,  the  absorptive  capacity  is  lower  at  district 
hospital level. The absorption capacity ranges between 58.3 percent (for Apac hospital) to 
70.9 percent (Mubende Hospital). The figure for Apac Hospital is well below the national 
average of 69.6 percent (Table 4). From the discussions with NMS, this is largely because of 
NMS’s inability to stock enough medicines due to supply constraints. Specifically, there was 
lack of funds to have sufficient stocks due to the fact that payments are on the basis of 
reimbursement.  
c. District lower health facilities 
5.12.    The lower health facilities levels registered higher supplies of drug and health 
supplies as a proportion of their committed funds by MoH (Table 4). By end of the three 
cycles, districts had received nearly 93 percent of medicines and health supplies nationwide. 
Turning  to  the  sampled  districts,  Rukungiri  district  had  received  63.6  percent  of  the 
commitment; and the other sampled districts had received drug and health supplies well 
above their drug budget allocations by MoH. The oversupply to some lower facilities has to 
be interpreted with caution. According to NMS officers, this is a result of unfulfilled orders in 
the previous period. 
5.13.    Broadly speaking, it is evident that public health facilities at all levels were 
not able to procure 100 percent of the credit line medicines as per MoH committed funds to 
NMS. The plausible explanations include: bureaucracy in procurement, non-availability of 
drugs at NMS, low capacity at both NMS and district level, unintended delays between 
ordering and delivery of medicines, to name a few. For instance, lower health facilities: are 
not  aware  of  their  budget  allocations under  credit  line;  their  system  of  ordering  drugs 
remains ad hoc in nature; and are unable to quantify required medicines vis-à-vis disease 




Table 4: Credit Line Medicines and Health Supplies Funds, May 2008-April 2009 
Facility level  Amount (Ushs)  %supplied 
Committed  Supplied 
Regional referral hospitals       
 Hoima Hospital  80,066,310  62,026,055  77.5 
 Others    1,345,531,440  1,008,766,981  75.0 
Sub-total (A)  1,425,597,749  1,070,793,037  75.1 
       
District hospitals       
 Apac  Hospital   67,683,637  39,446,693  58.3 
 Kamuli Hospital  67,683,913  46,870,879  69.2 
 Mubende Hospital  78,177,726  55,408,194  70.9 
 Others   2,709,896,919  1,892,768,324  69.8 
Sub-total (B)  2,923,442,195  2,034,494,090  69.6 
       
District lower health facilities       
 Apac  148,613,117  192,651,513  129.6 
 Hoima  127,017,352  127,903,163  100.7 
 Kamuli  177,106,022  221,9 67,370  125.3 
 Mubende   144,987,762  165,295,471  114.0 
 Rukungiri  111,194,915  70,753,836  63.6 
 Others   8,470,693,306  7,729,557,991  91.3 
Sub-total  (C)  9,179,612,474  8,508,129,344  92.7 
Total (A + B + C)  13,528,652,418  11,613,416,471  85.8 
Source: The committed funds are from MoH records; and data on actual deliveries are from NMS records last accessed April 2009 
Notes:  
 
b) Procurement and Disbursement 
 
5.14.   At  the  time  of  undertaking  this  research,  money  for  medicines/medical 
supplies would flow from MoFPED to MoH. MoH would then advise NMS how much credit it 
had for delivery of medicines. The NMS would then embark on the procurement, storage 
and distribution of pharmaceuticals/medical supplies and, later, present its invoices to MoH 
for reimbursement. This system unnecessarily keeps the money in MoH and, in the process, 
starves  NMS  of  the  funds  needed  to  efficiently  and  effectively  procure  and  distribute 
medicines to the users. The direct transfer of money for medicines/medical supplies from 
MoFPED to NMS is, therefore, recommended as will be emphasized later. 
5.15.   Regardless of facility level, there was evidence of poor communication in the 
process  of  ordering  and  communication:  First,  while  it  was  understood  that  all  health 
facilities are communicated to their budgets for credit line medicines at the beginning of 
every financial year, the reality on the ground was different. The communication is to DHOs 
and through DHOs to in-charges of HSDs. Lower level health facilities get communication in 
this regard from DHOs or from in-charges of HSDs, either verbally or in rare circumstances  
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written. In some districts, this communication is done when the in-charges of HC IIs and HC 
IIIs come to the district headquarters to do the ordering. In this manner, the in-charges 
rarely benefit from existing documentation on medicines stock. Failure to retain copies at 
this level makes it difficult to verify the delivered orders. Once the ordering is done, in most 
cases  the  in-charges  do  not  retain  a  copy  of  the  order.  Differences  in  practices  imply 
differences in efficiencies while placing the orders for medicines both in terms of timeliness 
and the right quantification. Invariably, only the DHO and the HSDs had knowledge of the 
budget for credit line medicines for health facilities in a district.   
5.16.    In others, participation of lower health facilities takes a different form that 
involves the staff of lower health centres. In such districts, in-charges of HSDs write to in-
charges of lower health centres informing them of the money available for medicines for 
their facilities. The in-charges at lower level are required to assess the medicines needs at 
their centres and place orders for onward submission to the HSD. Thereafter, the onward 
procedure for handling the orders remains the same.   
5.17.    It  emerged  from  field  visits  that  different  practices  produce  different 
performance of health personnel in lower health facilities. In some health facilities, almost 
all medical personnel at a facility know the entire process of acquisition and utilization of 
credit line medicines and in others only the in-charge of a health facility knows. 
5.18.    Regardless of the form participation by health facilities take in ordering for 
medicines, invariably not all the medicines ordered for from NMS get delivered at health 
facilities. On average, about 85 of credit line medicines ordered from NMS get delivered to 
health facilities (Table 4). However, none of the health facilities visited had a record on the 
discrepancy  between  what  was  ordered  and  what  was  received  –  an  issue  of  record 
management. In addition, none of the health facilities could explain what happens to the 
balance allocated. 
b) Primary Health Care 
5.19.    Unlike the acquisition of credit line medicines that does not involve money, 
acquisition of PHC medicines involves cash. The MoFPED releases PHC money (for both 
medicines and operational expenses) to districts. The government allocated Ushs28.71bn 
towards  PHC  including  and  non-wage  recurrent  for  FY2008/09.  Assuming  that  the  PHC 
guidelines are adhered to – the regional hospitals take up to 20.8 percent, district hospitals 
19.6  percent  and  districts  59.6  percent  of  the  total  PHC  allocated  to  medicines  (of 
Ushs17.6bn for the period July 2008 – March 2009 - Table 6). By extension, Table 6 further 
shows that at the time of undertaking this study about 42.2 percent of the total PHC drug 
budget was spent at all levels. Medicines and health supplies under PHC can be procured 
either from NMS, JMS or the private. According to guidelines, procurement from JMS or the 
private pharmacies should occur when such medicines are not available at NMS. In the 
subsequent sections utilization of the PHC funds by health facility level is discussed since the 
guidelines differ. 
a. Referral hospitals 
5.20.   Referral hospitals independently manage and account for funds released for 
medicines and non-wage recurrent under PHC. At the time of conducting field visits (end of 
March  2009),  the MoFPED had  released  80 percent  of  the  approved  allocations  to the  
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referral hospitals. By end of May 2009, they had received 100 percent releases. However, 
the study discussion focuses on the releases made by end March 2009. The MoFPED had 
released Ushs8.5bn out of Ushs10.6bn required in FY2008/09 (Table 5). The releases to the 
referral hospitals are made directly to respective hospital accounts to enable smooth and 
uninterrupted operations. It is evident from Table 5 that the budget allocated to medicines 
range from 37.5 percent to 49.4 percent of the total PHC budgets for the referral hospitals. 
Table 5: Primary Health Care Releases to Referrals Hospitals- July 2008-June 2009, Ushs 
Hospital name  Medicines  Non-wage,  
recurrent  
Total  %  share of 
Medicine 
Arua            335,400,000    461,788,618    797,188,618   42.1 
Fort Portal            404,200,000    510,270,450    914,470,450   44.2 
Gulu            350,025,000   453,730,000     803,755,000   43.5 
Hoima            345,525,000    473,785,220    819,310,220   42.2 
Jinja            492,829,000    655,722,000    1,148,551,000   42.9 
Kabale            362,750,000    437,255,613   800,005,613   45.3 
Masaka            424,171,000    662,966,540    1,087,137,540   39.0 
Mbale            452,000,000    766,681,030   1,218,681,030   37.1 
Soroti            357,896,000    441,477,110    799,373,110   44.8 
Lira            382,000,000    488,122,660     870,122,660   43.9 
Mbarara            644,025,000    710,626,607     1,354,651,607  47.5 
Total         4,550,821,000   6,062,425,848   10,613,246,848   42.9 
Source: MoFPED , Releases to referral hospitals (Recurrent Non-Wage) FY2008/09 
 
5.21.    The PHC amounts spent on drugs and health supplies at the regional referral 
hospitals are shown in Table 6. Hoima Regional Referral hospital was allocated Ushs345.5m 
for the procurement of drugs. By end of April 2009 records from NMS, JMS and private 
pharmacies, reveal that the hospital had procured medicines and health supplies worth 
Ushs226.4m, which is about 66 percent of their medicines budget release. However, Hoima 
Hospital procured more medicines, in value terms, from JMS than NMS (Table 7). The other 
regional referral hospitals had procured medicines and health supplies worth Ushs1,847.6m 
(excludes medicines procured from private pharmacies), which is about 44 percent of their 
budget release for medicines. Again here, the value of purchases from JMS was well above 
those from NMS. 
5.22.    Overall, regional referral hospitals taken together procured medicines and 
health supplies worth Ushs2.1bn, which is nearly 46 percent of the PHC budget release. 
Broadly speaking, the regional hospitals generally procured most of their medicines and 
health supplies from JMS.  The data reveals that regional hospitals procured 8.3 percent of 
their medicines and health supplies from NMS (Table 7). This poses a fundamental question 
whether NMS is respected as the first point of call for public procurements. According to the 
DHOs, JMS is more efficient than NMS – in terms of timely delivery and fulfilment of orders. 
In addition, it was observed that JMS had systems that seemed to work better and it was 
operating on a cash basis. For instance, every quarter JMS convenes a meeting of experts to 
review the disease pattern and recommend on appropriate levels of stocks of medicines, 




Table 6: PHC Funds on Drugs and Health Supplies during July 2008-March 2009, Ushs 
Facility level  Releases 
Expenditure on 
medicines  percentage 
Referral hospitals:       
Hoima   278,643,000  226,374,574  65.5 
Others  3,502,143,000  1,847,558,440  43.9 
Sub-total (A)  3,789,786,000  2,073,933,014  45.6 
       
District hospitals:       
Apac  76,444,132  30,055,423  39.3 
Kamuli  76,444,445  57,118,926  74.7 
Mubende  88,296,504  29,073,508  32.9 
Others  3,077,895,598  2,073,626,902  67.4 
Sub-total (B)  3,319,080,679  2,181,907,951  65.7 
       
District lower health facilities:       
Apac  169,038,713  71,396,521  42.2 
Hoima  137,006,874  37,793,038  27.6 
Kamuli  198,551,488  85,673,357  43.1 
Mubende  148,561,313  77,316,912  52.0 
Rukungiri  129,673,851  122,593,588  94.5 
Others   9,696,722,721  6,331,459,828  65.3 
Sub-total (C)  10,479,554,960  6,533,124,064  62.3 
Total (A+B+C)  17,588,421,639  10,788,965,029  42.2 
Source: Column 2 is based on the total releases from MoFPED and calculated based on the PHC guidelines from MoH; 
 Column 3 NMS/JMS/Hospital/districts. 
Notes: Notes: a) By April 2009, referral hospitals had received 100% of the releases for medicines.  
(b)  Actual expenditures on drugs for other district lower health facilities/referral hospitals /district hospitals do not include 
purchases from private pharmacies.  
c) District lower health facilities also include municipalities 
d) The figure for Mubende Hospital was recorded as Ushs21,243,508 based on hospital records. It was difficult to establish the 





Table 7: Source of Medicines by Facility Level, July 2008 – March 2009, Ushs 
Facility level 
Source 
Total  NMS  JMS  Private 
Regional referral hospitals:         
Hoima  0  36,461,762  10,226,000  46,687,762 
Others   152,614,768  1,694,943,672  na  1,847,558,440 
Sub-total (A)  152,614,768  1,731,404,434  10,226,000  1,894,246,202 
District hospitals:         
Apac   0  30,055,423  0  30,055,423 
Kamuli   27,114,926  8,900,000  21,104,000  57,118,926 
Mubende  0  21,243,508  7,830,000  29,073,508 
Others   294,506,394  1,779,120,508  na  2,073,626,902 
Sub-total (B)  321,621,320  1,839,319,439  28,934,000  21,898,874,759 
District lower health facilities:         
Apac  27,172,490  44,224,031  0  71,396,521 
Hoima  0  37,793,038    37,793,038 
Kamuli  85,673,357  0  0  85,673,357 
Mubende  41,496,912  0  35,820,000  77,316,912 
Rukungiri  0  122,593,588    122,593,588 
Others  1,400,643,811  4,930,816,017  na  6,331,459,828 
Sub-total (C)  1,482,558,136  5,050,565,929  35,820,000  6,533,124,064 
Total (A+B+C)  1,596,793,224  8,611,289,802  74,980,000  10,617,245,025 
Source: Column 2 – NMS records; column 3 – JMS records accessed on April 2009. 
Notes: *na – means that the research team was not able to get information on private suppliers for districts not covered in the 
sample 
b. District hospitals 
5.23.    The district hospitals also receive medicines under the PHC. They are self-
accounting institutions and report to the DHO Office. The PHC funds are released to the 
respective district accounts, and thereafter transferred to the hospital accounts with the 
approval of DHO and CAO offices. During the period FY2008/09, GoU’s budget as conditional 
releases to the district hospitals was Ush10.7bn. However, as of March 2009, Ushs8.2bn had 
been released, indicating a 78 percent performance (Table 6). And records from MoFPED 
indicate  that  by  end  of  May  2009,  all  the  district  hospitals  had  received  100  percent 
releases. Therefore, the claims made by hospital accounting officers that there are delays in 
releasing funds from MoFPED do not arise since the releases are timely. Instead, delays 
occur at the districts. According to the guidelines, the hospitals are required to spend 40 
percent of the PHC funds on medicines and the rest on operations, health education and 
infection  control  at  DHO  offices  or  at  particular  health  facilities.  However,  information 
obtained from Apac and Mubende district hospitals indicate that the PHC guidelines were 
not adhered to. Specifically, Table 8 reveals that  Apac Hospital and Mubende Hospitals 
spent 77.1 percent and 50 percent respectively of the PHC funds on re-current expenses.    
5.24.    By the end of March 2009, district hospitals had procured medicines worth 
Ushs2.182bn  from  NMS  and  JMS.  However,  it  could  not  be  established  whether  the  
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remaining budget release of Ushs4.3bn would possibly be spent in the one or two months to 
the  end of  the  financial  year or had been  used  to procure  medicines from the  private 
pharmacies.  In  the  sampled  districts,  Mubende  Hospital  had  procured  medicines  and 
supplies from JMS and private pharmacies worth 32.9 percent of its budget release for 
medicines. The corresponding figure for Apac Hospital was about 42.2 percent and nearly 
43.1 percent for Kamuli Hospital. The hospitals of Apac and Mubende never procured PHC 
medicines from NMS (Table 7). On average, NMS only managed to supply 22.7 percent of 
medicines and health supplies to the districts on PHC funds.  Certificates of non-availability 
of  medicines  were  not  very  common  even  in  the  sampled  districts  to  permit  them  to 
procure from other sources. 
Table 8: PHC Releases and Actual Expenditures to Districts, July 2008 to March 2009, Ushs 
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Hospitals:               
Apac  191,110,330  95,555,165  147,476,881  30,055,423  13,578,026  77.1  39.3 
Kamuli  191,111,113  111,666,667  103,436,527  57,118,926  30,555,660  54.1  29.8 
Mubende  220,741,260  110,370,630  117,285,322  29,073.508  74,382,430  53.1  13.1 
Total (A)  602,962,703  317,592,462  368,198,730  116,247,857  118,516,116  61.0  27.4 
               
Lower  health 
facilities 
             
Apac  338,077,426  169,038,713  106,488,034  71,396,521  160,192,871  31.4  21.1 
Hoima*               
Kamuli  397,102,977  198,551,488  148,839,584  85,673,357  162,590,036  37.4  21.5 
Mubende  297,122,626  148,561,313  98,842,043  77,316,915  171,739,043  33.2  26.0 
Rukungiri  259,347,702  129,673,851  106,341,506  122,593,588  30,452,247  52.7  47.2 
Total (B)  1,291,630,731  645,825,365  460,511,167  356,980,381  524,944,187  38.9  28.9 
Total (A+B)  1,894,593,434  963,417,827  828,709,897  473,228,238  643,490,303  49.9  28.1 
Source: Districts documents, MoFPED 
Notes: *The research team was unable to get concrete information on lower health facilities in Hoima district. 
c) District lower health facilities 
5.25.   Another vote that is allocated to the district health facilities is the conditional 
transfers  to  PHC  (non-wage).  These  are  funds  allocated  for  drugs  and  recurrent 
expenditures in lower health facilities. Fifty percent of PHC money is expected to be used for 
the procurement of medicines and health supplies in line with MoH guidelines. The other 50 
percent is for meeting administrative and operational expenses at the health facility such as 
cost of utilities, compound maintenance, transportation, etc. As with district hospitals, a 
portion of the PHC funds remains in the DHO office to facilitate office operations. Similarly, 
HSDs also retain a portion of PHC funds to facilitate office operations. However, it was 
difficult to establish the proportion of money retained at DHO office. 
5.26.    Government approved Ushs28.7bn as PHC non-wage for 80 districts and 13 
municipalities’ health centres for FY2008/09 (Table A 1, last row). As of end of March 2009  
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Ushs20.9bn had been released accounting for 73 percent of the releases. And by end of May 
2009,  95  percent  of  the  approved  allocations  had  been  released  to  the  districts  and 
municipal  councils.  The  MoFPED  releases  PHC  funds  almost  monthly  to  enable  the 
uninterrupted operations of the health facilities. However, PHC releases to lower health 
units hardly follow any pattern. As already alluded to, the DHO office is the accounting 
officer (assisted by HSDs) on these funds. While the MoH guidelines on utilisation of PHC 
funds  are  in  place, it was established  that officials in  the sampled  districts  treated the 
allocation criteria as a guideline (with freedom to vary the proportions) not a condition. And 
most of them used this as an incentive to misallocate or misappropriate the funds meant for 
PHC drugs. Consequently, in some districts such as Kamuli, Hoima, and Mubende as much as 
60 to 70 percent of PHC resources get utilized for operational and administrative expenses, 
leaving a paltry 40 to 30 percent for the acquisition of medicine. However, the practice was 
different in Rukungiri district where the health authorities adhered to MoH PHC guidelines 
by disbursing 52.7 percent of the PHC funds released to the purchase of medicines (Table 6). 
5.27.    Findings from the field visits reveal large variations in the management and 
the utilisation of the PHC funds. The DHO plays a major role in deciding on the distribution 
of PHC operational funds among health facilities in a district. In some districts (e.g. Hoima) 
as high as 15 percent of PHC operational funds are retained at the office of the DHO and 
another 15 percent are retained at the office of the in-charge of a HSD. Then a formula is 
worked  out  to  distribute  the  remaining  amount  among  the  different  levels  of  health 
facilities in a district, with HC IIIs getting higher allocation compared to HC IIs because of 
their perceived relatively bigger workload.  
5.28.    For  some  the  disbursement  of  PHC  recurrent  expenditures  was  being 
transferred to facilities’ accounts directly from the district account (and this proved the 
most efficient mechanism) and for others the health facilities could draw cash from the 
HSDs. In particular, Rukungiri, Hoima and Mubende are among the sampled districts that 
channel the money meant for general administrative activities to respective health units’ 
accounts. This practice has yielded better outcomes, although the percentage releases tend 
to vary from district to district as discussed in the subsequent sections. Some lower level 
health centres expressed concern about bank charges, which were reported to take up to as 
high as 30 percent of releases – this is in relation to the size of the transfer and charges to 
operate the account. 
5.29.    The ordering of  the PHC drugs  is  centrally done by  the  DHO office upon 
receiving all orders from the lower facilities. Complete information on PHC allocations and 
disbursements to all lower health facilities were obtained in Apac, Mubende, and Rukungiri 
districts.  
5.30.    In addition to a small PHC budget for medicines in some districts, lower level 
health centres are hardly involved in ordering for  PHC medicine. In Apac and Rukungiri 
districts, the DHOs involve lower level health centres in preparing orders for PHC medicine. 
In Hoima, Kamuli and Mubende districts, the practice is different – the DHO working with 
the in-charges of HSDs makes orders for PHC medicine. Unlike credit line medicines that are 
delivered at the district earmarked for particular health centres, the distribution of PHC 
medicines  to  lower  health  centres  is  at  the  discretion  of  the  DHO,  sometimes  with 
participation of in-charges of HSDs.  
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5.31.    It emerges, therefore, that lower level health centres have no information 
about their entitlements as regards the budget for PHC medicine; they just receive whatever 
the DHOs allocate to them. In most cases, lower level health centres are required to collect 
the medicines from the office of the DHO. The cost of collecting medicines is borne by the 
lower level health centres from their PHC operational funds, which in some districts are 
indeed inadequate. 
c) Third Party Medicines with focus on QCIL 
 
5.32.   Malaria remains the leading killer disease in Uganda. The children below five 
years of age, the pregnant mothers and the people infected with HIV/AIDS are the most 
vulnerable. As a result of resistance to chloroquine, fansidar and a combination of both 
chloroquine and fansidar, the government changed its treatment policy for malaria making 
coartem (ACTs) as the first line treatment of the disease. Although anti-malarial medicines 
are part of the essential medicines, they are not procured directly by NMS as is the case 
with other essential medicines. Instead, the funds for ACTs and ARVs are allocated to QCIL 
to supply GoU. The QCIL delivers the ARVs and ACTs at the NMS and JMS for distribution to 
the public health facilities and PNFP units. In this regard, coartem and ARVs are considered 
as third party drugs –focusing on tracking the former. Coartem is distributed to the public 
health facilities in four sub-types which are differentiated by colour for different ages (Table 
9). Table 9 further shows the number of doses of coartem by type that had been distributed 
to the public health facilities in Uganda by end of May 2009. 
5.33.  The  results  clearly  indicate  that  coartem  brown  was  supplied  in  small 
quantities while yellow in large amounts. In total, government provided free treatment of 
malaria through QCIL to approximately 6.4 m doses. This appears rather too little given that 
the population of Uganda is approximately 30 m people. This means that treatment of 
malaria was only available for only 21.4 percent Ugandans both children and adults. Of all 
the children less than five years in Uganda only 15 percent could receive free treatment 
from the health facilities. Children in the age bracket of 7 to 12 years only 1.4 percent were 
provided for and 5 percent for the adults. This means that children and adults each get 
malaria once in a year which is not the case in most parts of the country. Therefore, the 
rampant  stock  outs  of  anti-malarials  are  a  result  of  insufficient  supplies  of  the  drugs.  
Measured in money value, a total of Ushs16.2bn was spent on the procurement of anti-
malarial medicines (coartem).  By implication, of the Ush60bn for the supply of ACTs and 
ARVs (Table 2) only 27 percent was spent to anti-malarial medicines yet it is the number one 
killer disease in Uganda. QCIL was the major supplier of ACTs in FY2008/09. Other supplies 
were savings from the Global Fund in FY2007/08. 
Table 9: Distribution of coartem by type, July 2008 – May 2009 
Type of coartem   Target 
population by 
age (years) 
Total doses  Amounts US$   % of population 
(30millon) 
Yellow  < 2  3,175,435  2,032,279  10.6 
Blue  2 – 7  1,334,871  1,641,892  4.4 
Brown   7 – 12  419,630  805,690  1.4 
Green  >12  1,503,578  3,608,588  5.0 
Total      6,433,514  8,088,447  21.4 
Source: MoH supplies from QCIL 





5.34.     It is evident from the analysis that there are challenges in the drug delivery 
mechanisms  in  Uganda.  The  three  drug  delivery  modalities  –  credit line, PHC  and  third 
parties – seem not to have led to improved delivery of medicines. Overall, bringing the 
findings  under  credit  line and PHC  medicines,  some  observations  do  emerge.  First, the 
performance under the two delivery systems varies across and within districts. There are 
supply constraints and failure to adhere to the written guidelines. There seem to be an 
incentive to misappropriate PHC funds with limited supervision of the DHO and MoH; and 
NMS is rarely taken as first point of call as per PHC guidelines from MoH. Comparison across 
districts,  for  example,  revealed  that  Rukungiri  performed  better  relative  to  the  other 
districts in following the set out PHC guidelines. Apac performed least on both credit line 
and PHC medicines. Within district, performance varied by facility level and source of funds 
for medicines. Second, there was failure to provide full accountability. For instance, not all 
money allocated  for  medicines are  spent  on  a timely  basis  and  on  the set purposes  – 
introducing inefficiencies in the system. Broadly speaking, failure to procure medicines 100 
percent under credit line and 100 percent utilisation of PHC funds for medicines raises 
fundamental  questions.  Some  district  officials  argued  that  funding  for  PHC  non-wage 
recurrent is well below their operations requirements resulting into reallocating PHC drug 
funds  to  operations.  While  this  might  sound  a  genuine  explanation,  failure  to  provide 
evidence on total accountability for all PHC funds is questionable. 
5.35.    The institutional partnerships discussed in Chapter Three in part impacts on 
the delivery mechanism. However, performance varies across districts and within districts 
performance varies by facility level. It is also evident that performance varies by modality of 
delivery. Records management and flow of medicine-related information between the DHO 
office and lower facilities need to be strengthened. To sum it up, there is generally poor 
culture of accountability at different levels.  
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6.  Health Facilities and the People --‘Responsiveness’ to the Drug Delivery Systems 
6.1.  In this chapter the perceptions from in-charges at lower health facility level and from 
beneficiaries in the sampled districts are presented and discussed. The information from the 
field visits is supplemented with information from secondary data especially from household 
surveys conducted by the Uganda Bureau Statistics (UBoS). This chapter begins by discussing 
the management of drugs, drug stock outs at health facilities based on interviews with a 
sample  of  in-charges  of  health  facilities  at  all  levels.  The  voices  from  the  beneficiaries 
regarding  the  drug  delivery  mechanisms  –availability  of  drugs,  the  perceptions  of  the 
beneficiaries are also discussed.  
Management of Health Facilities with Focus on Drugs 
 
6.2.  This sub-section presents field findings on the management of health facilities with a 
focus  on  drug.  Specifically  issues  around  storage,  stock  management  and  distribution, 
ordering,  timeliness  and  challenges  are  discussed.  The  discussions  draw  heavily  on 
interviews held with the in-charges in the respective health facilities. 
6.3.  Ideally, ordering of the drugs and health supplies at facility level should be in line with 
the disease burden and population in communities served by the health facility. The in-
charges reported malaria as the most common disease among the patients that seek care 
from their facilities followed by cough and diarrhoea. In addition, 32 percent of the in-
charges reported HIV/AIDS related illnesses. Yet ordering of drugs is hardly based on the 
burden of disease as the supply of medicines for treatment of malaria and HIV/AIDS is left 
largely in the hands of “third parties” or simply outside the system of credit line drugs. This 
suggests, therefore, that the system of credit line drugs is not addressing the disease burden 
challenge adequately. 
a)  Management of stocks 
6.4.  The  availability  and  proper  maintenance  of  management  tools  facilitate  better 
monitoring of consumption patterns and regular supply of medicines and health supplies at 
facility level. Regular drug stock card update is important not only for knowing whether 
there are stock outs but also avoiding them. There are still challenges in the management of 
stocks at lower  health  facilities.  While  the  primary role of the  in-charge is  to  diagnose 
diseases and treat patients, they are also responsible for managing the stock of medicines in 
their facilities. For example, Butologo HC II, Mubende district, which is a hard-to-reach area, 
had only one member of staff. 
6.5.  In  the  management  of  medicines,  health  facilities  have  stock  cards  to  track  the 
movements and balance of all commodities stored at any place in the health unit.  In as far 
as medicines stock outs are concerned, the stock cards provide useful information to know 
whether stock levels are sufficient, and whether the medicines are used properly. Health 
facilities  are  expected  to  complete  information  on  the  extent  of  stock-out  monthly. 
However,  not  many  health  facilities  report  and  those  that  report  do  not  complete  all 
sections. For example, most of the health facilities visited did not complete sections on 
medicines  stock-out,  health  facility  management  and  funds  received  and  used.  If  this 
information was complete, it would be possible to follow up and assess the flow and use of 
medicines and funds.  Even in facilities where cards were filled in, there were information 
gaps at the verification process. For instance, nearly 18 percent of the in-charges did not fill  
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in information on quantities and nearly 30 percent did not include information on losses and 
adjustments. The challenges in filling the stock card especially at lower health facility levels 
cannot be overemphasised. Capacity gaps in filling  in/updating the cards were noted in 
various health facilities. Some of the in-charges did not have the capacity to complete the 
cards and in other cases might be lack of commitment. Failure to fill in the stock cards would 
impact on the information to be reflected in the Health Management Information System 
(HMIS) 105 as discussed below. 
6.6.  In Uganda Logistical Management Information System (LMIS) is included in the HMIS 
105 section 5 on the ‘Essential Drugs, Vaccines and Contraceptives’. Appropriate use of the 
HMIS  has  the  potential  to  improve  the  acquisition  and  distribution  of  medicines,  its 
management, and management of the PHC funds. Under the current arrangements, health 
facilities are supposed to use information collected on HMIS forms to effectively manage 
resources - including buildings and equipment, human resources, finance, medical and other 
supplies. Health facilities are required to compile financial summaries on a monthly basis 
indicating funds received and funds spent in the categories of PHC wage, PHC non-wage, 
PHC development, local governments, credit line medicines, donor projects, and others. 
Health facilities are expected to complete this form every month. The data collected are 
supposed to inform the higher authorities on the state of stock at a given facility highlighting 
stock at hand, quantities used of each medicine and losses and adjustments, if any. It was 
noted that the HMIS 105 Section 5 was never completed in Kamuli district; partly filled in 
Mubende, Rukungiri and Apac. For Kamuli district and some of the sampled health facilities 
in other districts, leaving this section empty would imply no drug stock outs. While 71.8 
percent of the in-charges reported submitting monthly reports to district level, there was no 
hard evidence to demonstrate that this happens. These forms were only access at the DHO 
office. It was observed that information on stock management and accountability of PHC 
funds was rarely filled in. While filling in the HMIS 105 would give a clear picture on disease 
burden and stock outs of commonly used drugs, the failure to dully complete the sections of 
medicines, funds received and used, and management  of this form raises concerns. No 
convincing explanation was obtained on why these particular sections are almost never 
completed.  
b)  Quantification of drugs at facility level 
6.7.  The in-charges were requested to indicate who determines the quantities of medicines 
ordered. Of 46 in-charges that responded, the majority (84.8 percent) reported that health 
facility determines this. Others reported that this is done at higher level (either district level 
or Health Centre IV). The subsequent ordering also varies across levels. For instance, some 
62.8 percent reported that they do use a formula. However, there was no evidence on the 
formulae used, because none of them could easily give their minimum and maximum stock 
of  any  of  the  medicines  used  at  facility  level.  Other  In-charges  use  ad-hoc  means  to 
determine their drug needs. The lack of clear method of quantification of medicines ordered 
at facility level greatly contributes to the stock outs of essential medicines. As a result, there 
is either over or under quantification of medicines. Over quantification of some drugs would 
utilize  funds  that  would  be  used  in  procuring  relevant  medicines.  This  introduces 
inefficiencies  in  the  system.  Cases  were  also  noted  where  lower  facilities  had  more 
medicines than the higher ones. For example, in Kamuli district, a HC II had more medicines 
than what it had ordered. The health centres was found to supply medicines to HC IIIs 
(Interview 03 March 2009, Kinu HC II supplying to Bulopa HC III).   
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6.8.  A few practical issues arose on how quantification of medicines is done, the manner in 
which the quantification is done and the record management at the health facilities. It was 
found that in Kamuli, Mubende and Hoima in-charges are given short notices to come and 
do the ordering at the district office. They do not consult the stock cards, they instead use 
intuition and experience. Upon ordering, they are expected to retain a copy of the order at 
the health facility to cross check whether the medicines they ordered are the one that have 
been  delivered.  Rarely  do  they  pick  their  copy.  Their  copy  remains  at  the  district  for 
completion of the ordering procedure. It is expected that the in-charges should pick their 
own copy – which rarely happens. It could not be established whether these practical issues 
are responsible for some facilities having stock out while others have more medicines than 
they need.  
c)  Transportation of medicines 
6.9.   Transportation of medicines remains a challenge, especially from the district to the 
lower health facilities. NMS has made transportation to district headquarters easy. Every 
two months, it transports medicines – although with more than 80 districts now, this may 
also become a logistic challenge. 
6.10.  Medicines  reach  health  units  through  any  of  the  following  means:      DHO 
transports to health facilities or health facilities go to pick the medicines. It could be by 
public means in situations where the facilities do not have transport of their own. This 
would not be a major challenge had the health facilities had sufficient funds to undertake 
this process. Of the 45 in-charges, 53.3 percent reported drug delivery by the office of the 
DHO, and for the rest delivery was done by the facility – using public means, private vehicle, 
motorcycles, bicycles or by foot. Although the extent to which this contributes to stock outs 
of medicines could not be established, this arrangement raises matters of concern. 
d)  Delivery of medicines  
6.11.    Of the 42 in-charges, 76.2 percent reported that it takes more than 30 days 
to receive their orders. In addition, orders are not fully honoured.  This partly reflects poor 
procurement  planning  and  inability  by  to  forecast  future  demand  by  drug  suppliers  in 
particular  NMS.  However,  it  was  difficult  to  corroborate  this  information  from  the  in-
charge’s records to NMS. 
Extent of Availability of Drugs 
6.12.    This section discusses stock outs of the essential drugs and health supplies at 
facility level. Table 10 shows stock management of various drugs based on the observations 
of the Research Team. The information included whether the facility had a stock card and if 
so, was it up to date. It is clear in the second column that not all the 50 facilities visited had 
stock card for monitoring the various medicines. It should also be noted that not all those 
facilities that had stock card had been up dated as expected.  Of those with up dated stock 
cards, stock outs were commonly for anti-malarial - coartem. Yet it is the first line treatment 
for  malaria.  High  stock outs  are observed  for  quinine tablets,  which is  the  second line 
treatment  for  malaria.  The  duration of  stock  outs  illustrates  the  delays  in  re-supply  of 
medicines. By implication, patients are less likely to get prescribed medicines. It is evident 
that the delays in re-stocking is more severe for anti-malarial – which are procured under 
third party.  
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6.13.    The stock outs were less common for painkillers. This is consistent with the 
information reported by the patients as presented in the next section. Health Centre IVs and 
district hospitals, which among other things offer Anti Retroviral Treatment (ART) were well 
stocked with ARVs but experience stock outs of most of the essential medicines. Stock outs 
were higher for those medicines where NMS is not in control. By implication, NMS as a 
national institution would be made to perform better if given a chance – to supply more 
drugs than under PHC and be responsible for anti-malarials stock outs. It should also be 
given more autonomy.  
Table 10: Stock Management in the Main Stock Rooms at Health Facility Level  
Type of drug  
Stock Card 
Stock outs in 
last 6 months 
(out of facilities 
in (c)) 
Duration of stock outs, days 





Min  Max  Average 
First line anti-malarials:             
Coartem yellow  37  28  13  0  225  67 
Coartem blue   26  19  16  0  225  81 
Coartem brown   15  12  12  6  300  161 
Coartem green  24  19  18      124 
             
Other anti-malarials:             
Fansidar  41  28  9    180  46 
Quinine tablets  24  16  11      90 
Quinine injectable  39  29  3      128 
             
Pain killers:             
Panadol   40  30  5      31 
Aspirin   31  23  7      18 
             
Antibiotics:             
Septrin   41  32  6      41 
Amoxicillin   45  37  7      69 
             
De-worming:             
Albendazole   27  17  4      54 
Source: Author’s compilation from stock cards at the sampled health facilities. 
Notes:  i) Availability column refers to stock card relating to the study reference period. 
ii) Information gathered at the time of the survey 
 
6.14.   Other anti-malarial medicines in form of injectables were among the category 
of medicines reported as being in acute shortage most of the time or totally out of stock. 
Antibiotics  are  very  important  in  the  treatment  of  RTI  of  which  cough  is  one  of  the 
symptoms. In Uganda the most common antibiotics in the treatment of RTI are septrin and 
amoxicillin.  Septrin is also used as a prophylaxis among the HIV/AIDS patients to delay 
progression to AIDS. Therefore a stock out of the antibiotics does not only affect people 
with RTI but  also those under  chronic care. The stock  outs  of  the  antibiotics  were not 
common with only 14.3 percent and 15.6 percent of the facilities with up dated stock cards  
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for  septrin  and  amoxicillin  respectively.  These  findings  corroborate  with  those  of  UBoS 
(2008). The stock outs for septrin and amoxicillin lasted on average 41 and 69 days for 
septrin and Amoxicillin respectively. Most of the health facilities visited lacked gloves and 
syringes; patients are required to buy such items to enable medical personnel to examine or 
treat them.  Lack of gloves poses health risks for the medical staff. 
6.15.    Albendazole is one of the common medicines for the treatment of intestinal 
worms in both adults and children.  Further it is used during immunisation and child days. 
Albendazole is used as one of the components mainly for de-worming purposes. The stock 
out of this medicine was not common, with only 12.5 percent of the facilities that had up 
dated stock cards had had stock outs 6 months prior to the survey. The duration of the stock 
outs was on average 54 days. 
Perceptions of Beneficiaries 
 
6.16.    To  supplement  information  from  the  in-charges,  exit  interviews  were 
conducted  covering  252  patients  and  FGDs.  Nearly  66  percent  of  the  patients  that 
participated  in  the  exit  interviews  were  females  and  about  98 percent  had  received  a 
prescription from the health workers. It is common in Uganda to have a greater proportion 
of women than men seeking care in public health facilities. The reverse is true for private 
health facilities.  
6.17.    One  way  of  improving  the  quality  of  health  service  is  improving 
communication between the patient and the health workers. In other words, health workers 
are expected to explain to patients the drugs prescribed and how to administer them. Only 
16.9 percent of the patients received such information. This low figure is consistent with the 
findings based on the UNHS 2005/06. The analysis revealed that of the pregnant women 
that received anti-malarial drugs with last birth, 33 percent were not aware of the type of 
medicines given to them. This creates a knowledge gap among patients especially when 
drugs are not available at the public health facility and patients have to buy them from 
private pharmacies/drug stores. 
6.18.    On availability of medicines at health facility level, 52.8 percent reported to 
have received all the prescribed medicines
3 and the rest had either received some or no 
medicines at all. Of those that received some or no medicine, 53 percent were told to buy 
medicines elsewhere, 36.8 percent were told that there were no medicines and the rest 
never received response from the health workers. Information from secondary sources also 
points to cases of lack of free drugs. For instance, analysis based on the National Service 
Delivery Survey (NSDS) of 2008 data, reveals that of those who sought treatment in public 
health facilities 15.5 percent paid for drugs. Out of whom 27 percent reported that health 
workers  demanded for  money.  Furthermore, while level of  satisfaction in public health 
facilities improved during 2004 to 2008, 21 percent of the households reported that drug 
availability worsened during same period (UBoS, 2008). 
6.19.    Receiving prescribed medicines at facility level is a lengthy process. More 
than half of the  patients  reported  long  waiting  time.  The delays are  partly  due  to low 
                                                
3 The respondents also reported that there are required to purchase exercise books in which to write prescriptions since the health facilities 
lack stationary – medical form 5.  
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staffing levels. For instance, in lower health facility level, the health worker diagnoses and at 
the same time dispenses the medicine. Most of the respondents reported using the same 
facility whenever they are feeling unwell. And for the times they have used the same facility, 
33.2 percent of the respondents indicated receiving all prescribed medicines. 
6.20.    Findings from focus group discussions revealed much dissatisfaction by final 
beneficiaries of health services, especially at the lowest level health facility (i.e. HC II). The 
beneficiaries  reported  the  inefficiencies  in  the  delivery  of  health  services.  Stock-out  of 
medicines was cited as a major problem whenever they visited a health facility to seek 
treatment. There was lack of stationary (medical form 5) on which to write prescriptions for 
patients; patients are, therefore, required to purchase exercise books in which prescriptions 
are written for them. This was a rampant problem in most health facilities that were visited. 
And inadequate equipment to work with e.g. gloves; syringes; laboratory equipment; and 
dental equipment was also cited. Patients are required to buy syringes to enable medical 
personnel to administer intra-venal treatment on them. Lack of medical equipment also 
demoralizes medical workers; one dentist at a HC IV in Mubende district reported that due 
to lack of medical equipment she was applying less than 3 percent of her professional skills 
and  was  demoralized.  Stock  outs  of  medicines  and  lack  of  supportive  infrastructure 
contribute  to  low morale of  the medical personnel.  While  many patients reported that 
medical workers attend to their duties, they also noted that the medical workers were 
demoralised. 
6.21.    Poor health services, especially the intermittent supply of medicines keep 
away  the  sick  that  would  have  otherwise  sought  treatment  from  those  facilities.  The 
situation  is  much  more  pronounced  in  lower  health  facilities,  especially  HC  IIs. 
Consequently, when people fall sick, they prefer to go directly to larger facilities within their 
localities (HC IVs and hospitals). Experience has taught them that they receive relatively 
better  treatment from  higher  level  health  facilities.  They  reported better diagnosis  and 
treatment at HC IIIs and hospitals because of functional laboratories, which are not available 
at HC IIs and some HC IIIs. This finding highlights a breakdown in the referral system. It is a 
common practice for people to seek treatment from referral hospitals even for diseases 
such as malaria that could be managed at lower health facilities. 
6.22.    Attendance at HC IIs improves only when medicines have been delivered at 
those facilities. Once people within a parish learn that medicines have been delivered at the 
HC II within their area, they rush to the health centre, fake sickness especially malaria, and 
obtain medicine, which they keep for use just in case they fall sick when medicines are not 
available at the health facility. Such behaviour partly contributes to stock-out of medicines, 
especially in lower level health facilities. 
Conclusions 
 
6.23.    The analysis brings out important issues that need immediate attention in 
order  to  improve  the  drug  delivery  system.  More  importantly,  the  analysis  highlights 
inefficient practises including the ordering of medicines, delays, poor record management, 
shortage  of  medicines/inadequate  stock  control  procedures,  poor  storage  practises  of 
medicines,  low  staffing  and,  to  a  less  extent,  transportation  of  drug  from  the  district 
headquarters to lower health facilities. It also comes out that shortage of medicines at HC IIs  
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has  resulted  into underutilisation of these  facilities  despite  the good intention to bring 
services closer to the people. These facilities are bypassed for better services at higher level. 
This leads to wastage of resources, both financial and human resources at HC II level. Drug 
quantification  in  comparison  with  disease  burden  in  the  communities  remains  a  big 
challenge.  Streamlining records management at all levels and allowing for effective flow of 
information between levels need not to be overemphasized. 
6.24.   The field findings have established that the flaws in the health system have 
resulted in stock outs or non-availability of essential drugs and medical supplies in health 
facilities at all levels – national, regional and local. The medicines and supplies in question 
include coartem, condoms, oral rehydration salts and gloves, all of which are extremely 
important to people’s health. The high stock-out of anti-malarials is exacerbated by lack of 
laboratories – which seem to have introduced an incentive for people to fake sickness. Anti-
malarial  stock  outs  were  less  prevalent  in those  health  facilities  where  such  diagnostic 
facilities were available.  
 
47
7.  Challenges in Acquisition, Distribution and Utilisation of Medicines 
 
7.1.  This  chapter  builds  on  the  previous  three  chapters.  It  outlines  the  challenges 
encountered in the acquisition, distribution and utilization of medicines in Uganda. All that 
is needed is greater determination in improving the governance of the health sector; the 
mobilization  of  adequate  financial,  logistical  and  human  resources;  and  the  effective 
coordination  of  the  different  institutional  actors  in  the  health  system.  The  research 
identifies the following key challenges: 
Rapid Population Growth, Depressing Demographics 
 
7.2.  Uganda’s population has grown at a rapid rate of 3.2 percent per year. It is expected to 
rise to 32 m by 2010 and to 43.9 m by the end of the second National Health Policy period 
(in 2020). This suggests that in 10 years, the health system must cater for an additional 12 m 
people. The population below 18 years of age  constitutes over 50 percent of Uganda’s 
population and has health needs that must be catered for. The Newborn Mortality Rate was 
33 per 1000 live birth in 2000. It decreased marginally to 29 in 2006 and accounts for 40 
percent of infant mortality today. Teenage pregnancy, which was about 25 percent in 2006, 
is among the highest in sub-Saharan Africa and significantly contributes to overall maternal 
mortality rate in Uganda (UBoS, 2007). In short, Uganda’s rapid population growth and 
depressing demographics are key challenges for the financing, procurement and distribution 
of medical services, in general, and medicines, in particular. 
Medicines versus the Underlying Determinants of Health  
 
7.3.  Evidence shows that medicines offer a simple, cost-effective solution to many medical 
ailments so long as they are available, affordable, and properly
 used (World Bank, 1994: 
p67). This suggests that the provision of the right quantity and quality of medicines, at the 
right time, is important in the pursuit of people’s right to health. However, evidence from 
this study shows that neither the flow nor the usage of medicines can be boosted unless the 
underlying determinants of good health – particularly sanitation and access to clean water; 
proper nutrition; the recruitment and retention of a highly motivated health workforce; and 
the  establishment of auxiliary  infrastructure are addressed. Such infrastructure includes 
housing  for health  workers, access  roads,  and solar  equipment  that  is  needed  to  keep 
vaccines in rural health centres at the right temperatures. A key challenge for Uganda is that 
the underlying determinants of good health are still poor. Greater investments in these 
areas are urgently needed. 
Diseases of the Poor 
 
7.4.  Another  key  challenge  is  that  the  diseases  of  the  poor  –  that  is,  communicable, 
maternal, prenatal, and nutritional diseases – still account for a substantial proportion of 
the burden of disease in Uganda. Malnutrition, for example, is a major factor in over 50 
percent of under-five deaths! Morbidity and mortality rates from other common childhood 
illnesses  are  also  high,  thanks  to  the  high  levels  of  poverty.  While  income  poverty 
dramatically declined from 56 percent in 1992 to 31 percent in 2005/06, Uganda is still a 
poor country. The GDP growth rate has undoubtedly been high, averaging 6.5 percent per 
year in  fifteen years.  However,  the rate  of economic  transformation has  not  been  fast  
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enough to match Uganda’s rapid population growth. As a result, the number of poor people 
has  not  reduced  significantly  during  the  same  period.  Through  field  interviews,  it  was 
established that the leading childhood illnesses are malaria, diarrhoea, measles and acute 
RTI, all of which are associated with poverty. Among the adults, HIV/AIDS, with an average 
prevalence of infection of 6.4 percent, is the leading killer, followed by TB and malaria. 
These diseases of the poor can be kicked out of Uganda. The challenge before MoH and 
other  stakeholders  is  to  massively  invest  in  preventative  interventions  (such  as  health 
education, proper nutrition, and the use of insecticide treated mosquito nets) as well as 
curative measures such as adequate supply and use of medicines. 
Diseases of the Rich 
7.5.  Non-communicable  diseases,  which  are  largely  ‘diseases  of  the  rich’  have  recently 
compounded Uganda’s disease burden and strained the country’s budget for medicines. As 
indicated  in  chapter  one,  the  diseases  of  the  affluent  are  an  emerging  challenge.  The 
challenge for Uganda is how to commit more resources to the diseases of the poor without 
neglecting the diseases of the affluent. Second, the country needs to reclaim space for 
health sector regulation and the enforcement of regulations.  
Stock outs of Medicines 
 
7.6.  Among the top HSSP II policy targets was the issue of increasing the percentage of 
health facilities without any stock outs of first line anti-malarial drugs, measles vaccines, 
Depo  Provera,  ORS  and  cotrimoxazole  from  40  percent  in  2003/04  to  100  percent  in 
2009/10. An important challenge for the health sector is that this policy target has not been 
attained. The in-charges of the public health facilities visited reported (in nine out of every 
10 cases – i.e. 90 percent of cases) that they experienced stock outs of anti-malarials and 
basic medical supplies – such as gloves within the six months that preceded the study. This 
is worse than the MoH report that “72 percent of government health units experience stock 
outs of at least one indicator medicines’ (MoH, 2009: 6 quoting MoH, 2008b). Patients who 
were  being  asked  to  purchase  medicines  and  medical  supplies  from  private  drugs 
shops/pharmacies  were  visibly  dissatisfied  with  public  health  workers.  Some  wananchi 
alleged that health workers were diverting public medicines to their private clinics or drug 
shops. [No concrete evidence for this was found]. The widespread problem of drug stock 
outs is a big challenge and is partly attributed to the health sector financing flaws. 
Health Sector Financing 
7.7.  Since 2000/2001, health expenditure as a proportion of government’s discretionary 
expenditure has stagnated at 9.6 percent. This falls below the Abuja Declaration target of 15 
percent.  Health sector funding is inadequate to provide the UNMHCP in all facilities. The 
per capita cost was roughly US$41.2 in 2008/09 and will rise to US$47.9 in 2011/12 (MoH, 
2009b). Yet, the MTEF estimation was US$12.5 in 2008/09, signifying a shortfall of about 
US$29 (MoH, 2009). At the time of the field visits, government and the donors were the 
main providers  of  funds  for  medicines in  Uganda.  In terms  of  value, as  already noted, 
government contributes 20 percent of the drugs, which cover 50 percent of the health 
needs. The third parties contribute 80 percent of drugs (in terms of value). At the time of 
research, donors were the main funders of anti-malarials (mainly coartem) and ARVs. [Only 
30 percent of the essential medicines and health supplies (EMHS) is provided for in the 
budget].  Global  initiatives  provide  the  bulk  of  resources  needed  for  malaria,  HIV,  
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tuberculosis, vaccines and reproductive health. In 2006/2007, for example, global initiatives 
contributed US$2.39 per capita of the US$4.06 per capita spent (MOH, 2009b). It is not clear 
how much of this actually reached the users in comparison with the amount that may have 
been retained by foreign expatriates and their local allies in the MoH/MoFPED. 
7.8.  But that is  not the point.  The  point is  that overdependence  on foreign sources  to 
finance the health sector is dangerous. Fieldwork established that the problem of drug stock 
outs was more serious for donor-funded  medicines and less  serious  for  those  that  are 
procured by NMS. To overcome this challenge, Uganda needs to embark on more effective 
coordination  of  NMS  procurement  efforts  with  those  of  donors.  Over  the  long-term, 
however, NMS needs to fully take charge of drug procurement by getting a larger share of 
the national budget. Once this happens, there must be zero-tolerance of drug stock outs. 
NMS officials must be personally held responsible if citizens are denied access to medicines 
on account of stock outs. 
7.9.  On  the  other  hand,  while  the  arguments  for  low  financing  remains  a  problem  in 
implementing health sector programs in general and in particular delivering quality and 
adequate  medicines,  the  implementing  units  should  utilise  the  funds  efficiently  and 
effectively. In other words, they must demonstrate value for money. 
Decentralized Health Service Delivery System 
 
7.10.  Uganda  currently  operates  a  decentralized  health  system  as  already 
mentioned. This system consists of (a) the district health infrastructure consisting of Village 
Health Teams (VHTs or HC Is), HCs II, III and IV plus general district hospitals. Beyond the 
district, the health system has Regional Referral Hospitals and National Referral Hospitals. 
The whole system is supervised by MoH. The key challenge is that such a complex system 
calls for proper coordination, support supervision and inspection. Health facility in-charges 
reported that while MoH was doing a commendable job in policy formulation, strategic 
planning and provision of nationally coordinated services such as epidemic control, more 
serious support supervision and inspection were needed, particularly at the level of health 
facilities. Weak inspection was reported to be a top factor in explaining why credit-line and 
PHC  medicines  do not  always reach the  beneficiaries. The  CAOs,  DHOs,  DHTs and HSD 
medical officers particularly need to increase the  scale, scope and regularity of support 
supervision in their areas of jurisdiction.  
Proliferation of Districts 
 
7.11.  The  proliferation  of  districts  is  placing  more  responsibility  for  support 
supervision and monitoring on the MoH. Yet the MoH budget is not necessarily increasing 
proportionately to cater for the rising need for more field staff, vehicles and time. Within 
the  newly  created  districts,  the  weak  institutional  and  human  resource  capacities  have 
compromised the procurement, distribution and use of medicines. For example, VHTs are 
important  in  deepening  health  awareness  and  promoting  the  use  of  health  services. 
However, only 30 of the over 80 districts have trained VHTs. New districts dominate the list 
of districts with untrained VHTs or weak HUMCs. The challenge for Uganda is to put a break 
on the proliferation of districts. Second, MoH should create health districts that combine 
several  political  districts.  In  this  case,  smaller  political  districts  should,  from  the  health  
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perspective, become HSDs. The challenge here is that CAOs are the accounting officers for 
service delivery at district level. 
Physical Access versus Actual Access 
 
7.12.  Government investment in HCs (II- IV) dramatically improved physical access 
to the health facilities. Today, 72 percent of households live within 5km of a health facility 
(public or NGO). The challenge is that while physical access improved, effective access to 
medicines has not. Evidence shows that utilization is limited due to lack of medicines and 
medical supplies. These are worsened by the shortage of functional wards at HC IVs, the low 
functionality of the solar systems and other equipment at the HCs; and the shortage of 
qualified health workers, and the de-motivation of the few that exist. 
Shortage/Low Motivation of Health Workers 
 
7.13.   Inadequate human resources have constrained the ability of Uganda’s health 
sector to fulfil its mandate of providing the medicines (and medical supplies) needed for 
universal  access  to  health  care.  In  November  2008,  only  51  percent  of  the  approved 
positions in the public health service were filled (MoH, 2009b). Moreover, wide variations 
exist among districts. For example, Pader in northern Uganda had only 35 percent of the 
posts filled. Butologo HC II in Mubende district (a difficult to reach area located 25 miles 
from Mubende town), had only one nurse (Elizabeth Iripo), who was evidently overworked. 
Shortages of critical staff such as nurses, doctors, nutritionists, anaesthetic and laboratory 
workers, have greatly constrained the provision of medicines and health services in general. 
Some districts (such as Rukungiri) are more able than others (such as Hoima, Kamuli and 
Mubende) to advertise vacant positions, fill them, and cause their health workers to access 
the payroll. [According to an interviewee, Rukungiri recruited even when there was a ban on 
recruitment, and their health workers accessed the payroll. In Rukungiri, support staff such 
as guards and cleaners, were on government payroll. In Kamuli, Nursing Assistants WERE 
observed mopping the floor of health facilities (there was no money to pay cleaners). In 
Hoima, a night guard at Kikuube HC IV had stopped working because his monthly salary of 
Ushs40,000 (which was paid from PHC funds) was in arrears for four months. He stopped 
reporting for duty because he was de-motivated; and the facility in-charge felt powerless to 
enforce discipline because of the delayed payment of the guard’s salary. At the time of the 
fieldwork, the solar panel at the health facility had been stolen, thanks to the absence of the 
night guard. The challenge for Uganda is to address these anomalies affecting the provision 
of medicines and health services more generally. This calls for the concerned parties to 
desist  from  treating  some  districts  more  preferentially  than others  (outside  the  official 
criteria for allocating finances and recruiting staff). 
The Role of the NGO Sector 
 
7.14.   The NGO or faith-based health facilities (referred to as the Private-Not-for-
Profit Organizations or simply PNFPs – see chapter 3) play a key role in health. The facility-
based NGOs account for 41 percent of the hospitals and 22 percent of the lower health 
facilities. With government’s financial support, the NGO sector operates 70 percent of the 
health training institutions. This is an important contribution. Yet, the NGO health centres 
(such  as  the  Catholic-based  Nyakibale  Hospital)  charge  user-fees.  While  community  
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members predominantly rated the services of faith-based hospitals as being better than 
public hospitals, many found the user-fees to be unaffordable, given the high levels of rural 
poverty. The challenge for government is to simultaneously boost people’s accessibility to 
medicines and address the affordability issue. An added challenge is that faith-based health 
facilities typically emphasize clinical work for which they charge fees. This carries the risk of 
neglecting  public health education.  Yet,  75 percent  of  Uganda’s disease  burden  can be 
overcome through health education promotion and prevention. This calls for rethinking of 
the role of the NGO sector vis-à-vis the public health sector in Uganda. 
 
Guidelines versus Conditionality 
7.15.   Regarding  the  financing  of  medicines  in  Uganda,  the  credit  line  funds  (as 
already noted) are given to NMS to procure medicines and health supplies; while the PHC 
funds are decentralized directly to the districts. The MoH guidelines state, among other 
things, that 50 percent of PHC funds are to be spent on medicines to supplement those 
procured by NMS using credit-line funds. The remaining 50 percent is to be spent on the 
general management of health facilities. The challenge is this. While the use of ‘guidelines’ 
as opposed to conditionality was meant to give discretionary powers to districts (under the 
framework of decentralization), the system is subject to abuse. Districts such as Hoima that 
use the guidelines as mere guidelines often spend a substantial proportion of PHC funds 
meant for drugs, on administration. Districts such as Rukungiri that take the guideline as a 
rule use the  funds to purchase medicines. Drug stock outs were more common among 
districts that take PHC guidelines as mere guidelines in comparison with those that strictly 
spend 50 percent PHC funds on medicines. This, points to the need for standardization 
across different districts. The challenge here is  that standardization may undermine the 
decentralization  norms  of  devolution  and  delegation  of  decision-making  authority. 
Notwithstanding this  challenge,  government  could  consider  transferring  both  credit  line 
grants and the proportion of PHC funds that is meant for drugs directly to NMS, which 
should then be charged with the responsibility of procurement and distribution of all the 
medicines to district health facilities. 
Health Management Information Systems (HMIS) 
7.16.   Information management in Uganda’s health sector is guided by the HMIS. 
The HMIS has the potential to improve the acquisition and distribution of medicines. The 
health facilities are required to compile financial summaries on a monthly basis indicating 
funds  received  and  funds  spent  in  the  categories  of  PHC  wage,  PHC  non-wage,  PHC 
development, local governments, credit lines (medicine), donor projects, and others (to be 
specified). In the management of medicines, health facilities have stock cards to track the 
movements and balance of all medicines in the health unit and the extent of (monthly) stock 
outs.  Stock  cards  provide  useful  information.  They  indicate  whether  stock  levels  are 
sufficient,  and  whether  the  medicines  are  used  properly.  The  HMIS  is  nevertheless 
compromised  by  incomplete  or  irregular  data.  The  MoH  estimates  the  timeliness  of 
reporting to be at about 68 percent (MoH, 2008b). Use of data for planning purposes is 
currently  low.  Most  of  the  health  facilities  visited  did  not  complete  the  sections  on 
medicines stock outs, health facility management and funds received and used. Inadequate 





7.17.   The  chapter  on  institutional  partnerships  makes  two  powerful  points.  No 
institution is an island. Second, virtually all institutions operate as partnerships. The key 
challenge  for  Uganda  is  how  to  improve  the  institutional  partnerships  involved  in  the 
medicines sub-sector. One of the key observations is that the flow of funds from MoFPED to 
NMS  through  MoH  breeds  avoidable  inefficiencies.  The  process  should  be  dramatically 
improved. Credit line  moneys  could  be transferred directly  from MoFPED  to  NMS.  The 
proportion of PHC funds meant for medicines to district lower health facilities and district 
hospitals should not be decentralized any more. It should be given to NMS to procure drugs. 
As  NMS  gets  adequate  and  timely  financial  resources,  the  MoH  should  strengthen  its 
supervisory capabilities and exert pressure on NMS to deliver its mandate. These messages 
clearly emerge from this study. The challenge for policymakers is to mobilize the will to 
reform and do the right thing. 
7.18.   There are also challenges in coordinating third parties. Each party comes with 
its interests. While the Paris Declaration calls for harmonization of donors, this seems not to 
work  for  medicines.  For  example,  DANIDA  provides  funds  directly  into  budget  support 
whereas USAID does not. Instead, USAID brings its own medicines and has its own supply 
chain. This is also true for other donors. 
Partnership for the Local Manufacture of Medicines 
 
7.19.   The  recent  partnership  between  GoU,  QCIL,  and  CIPLA presents  a  unique 
opportunity for the state-of-the-art technology transfer from India to Uganda. It presents a 
rare opportunity for the local manufacture of medicines for both humans and livestock. The 
challenge  is  to  ensure  that  foreign  pharmaceutical  giants  do  not  suffocate  local 
pharmaceutical firms to death –for example, via the ‘donation’ of free drugs. This will lead 
to unnecessary and unsustainable price-cutting wars. There must be assurance that the 
quality  of  local  medicines  remains  high.  People’s  negative  perceptions  that  locally 
manufactured medicines are of poor quality need to be corrected with verifiable evidence 
of high quality locally manufactured products. The NDA, the Government Chemists and MoH 
should play their role in ensuring that locally manufactured medicines are safe, effective and 
affordable. 
Health Unit Management Committees (HUMCs) 
 
7.20.   The  HUMCs  are  “voices”  of  the  final  beneficiaries  of  medicines.  They  are 
supposed to witness the arrival of medicines and ensure that the medicines actually reach 
the community. Members of HUMCs do not earn a salary. Some districts, and within any 
given district, some health facilities have more effective HUMCs than others. The challenge 
for government is not to abolish HUMCs, but to make them more effective. Government 
may wish to document the good practices and spread them elsewhere in the country. 
Inadequate Laboratories and Rapid Diagnostic Tests (RDTs) 
 
7.21.   Drug stock outs were less serious in districts (such as Rukungiri) that have 
laboratories and diagnostic kits for malaria than districts (such as Hoima, Kamuli, Mubende),  
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which  lack  these  facilities.  The  illegal  stocking  and  subsequent  abuse  of  drugs  by 
households, together with the rising resistance to medicines, were less serious problems 
where diagnostic facilities existed. The challenge for government is to mobilize resources for 
investing in laboratories and rapid diagnostic kits across the country. These, as indicated in 
chapter 3, are affordable. [For example, a microscope – which is an important facility in 
laboratories – costs less than US$300]. 
Supports for Health Service Delivery 
 
7.22.   The field findings have established that the effective delivery of medicines 
calls for substantial investments in auxiliary infrastructure i.e. the supports for health service 
delivery. These include staff housing; solar power; phone network coverage; the quality of 
roads; water and sanitation; and the quality of schools (for educating the children of health 
workers).  The  hard-to-reach  areas  have  difficulties  in  accessing  medicines  and  general 
health  services  precisely  because  of  poor  auxiliary  infrastructure.  The  challenge  for 
government is to invest in auxiliary infrastructure as a matter of urgency. 
Other Challenges 
 
7.23.   The  other  challenges  that  are  worth  attending  to  include  improving  the 
functionality  of  theatres  at  all  HC  IVs  and  other  health  facilities;  supplying  adequate 
equipment  such  as  gloves,  syringes,  and  dental  equipment;  investing  in  ambulances; 
streamlining  the  referral  system;  and  continuously  equipping  health  workers  with  new 
knowledge. There is also need for government and NGO health facilities to pay salaries that 
will motivate health workers, improve their commitment to patients, and prevent the brain-
drain that so seriously affects Uganda’s health sector. 
Conclusions 
 
7.24.   The  chapter  has  outlined  the  challenges  encountered  in  the  acquisition, 
distribution and utilization of medicines in Uganda. The main conclusion is that the flaws in 
the  flow of  medicines  can  be  overcome. All  that is  needed  is  greater determination in 
improving  the  governance  of  the  health  sector;  the  mobilization  of  adequate  financial, 
logistical and human resources; and the effective coordination of the different institutional 
actors in the health system. The challenge is big but not impossible.  
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8.  Conclusions and Emerging Issues 
 
8.1.  The study findings do provide insights into the drug delivery mechanism in Uganda. 
Some  reforms  in  the  health  sector  that  directly  impact  on  the  system  of  delivering 
medicines have been discussed. It is evident from the study findings that these reforms 
seem to have yielded mixed results. More importantly, the study examined the institutional 
partnerships and the three modalities of drug delivery – credit line, PHC and third party. It is 
argued that health outcomes cannot make substantial improvement until delivery systems 
are well managed, including that of drugs. A lot of issues that affect drug delivery systems 
include  tracking  of  public  spending  on  medicines,  institutional  partnerships,  conflicting 
regulations, expanding health  infrastructure, without proportionate  improvement  in the 
soft infrastructure to name a few. All these introduce inefficiencies in the system.  
8.2.  To address inefficiencies in the delivery of curative health services Government has 
broadly two choices: i) to panel-beat the existing system that is based on decentralisation by 
instituting measures that  could  improve efficiency;  or ii) to rethink and restructure the 
curative health delivery system with a view to ensuring that quality curative health services 
reach  the  intended  beneficiaries.  The  first  choice  may  not  be  tenable  to  Government 
because  of  institutional  inefficiencies  including  high  administrative  costs  relating  to  the 
delivery of curative health services in a decentralised system. Nonetheless, in subsequent 
sections  proposals  are made  about  how  inefficiencies  in the  delivery  of curative  health 
services, in general, and distribution of medicines, in particular could be plugged.  
8.3.  The  second  and  strongly  recommended  choice  option  of  restructuring  delivery  of 
curative health services is premised on the realization that the reforms so far undertaken in 
the health sector seem to have fallen short of delivering expected results in this regard. New 
reforms in the curative health services are needed to reduce the cost of administration of 
the  country’s  health  system  in  general  and  that  of  delivery  of  medicines  in  particular, 
thereby  increasing  financial  resources  for  curative  health  services.  In  this  regard, 
Government  should  consider  paying  beneficiaries  directly  for  curative  health  services 
obtainable  from  private  service  providers  (a  form  of  public-private  partnership).  The 
modalities  this  would  take  could include  instituting  a  system  of  issuing  curative  health 
coupons to intended beneficiaries.  Accredited  private  curative  health  services  providers 
would  receive  payment  from  Government  on presentation of  coupons.  The role  of the 
public sector in delivery of curative health services would be limited to hospitals (district 
and referral hospitals), which would be given conditional grants to purchase medicines from 
the  market  in  line  with  PPDA  guidelines.  Preventive  health  services  would  remain  the 
responsibility of the Government (both central and local Governments) but not necessarily 
managed by MoH. By reducing or trimming the cost of administration of the curative health 
services, Government  would  concentrate  on  preventive  health  services,  which could be 
provided by Government through a multi-pronged approach including interventions through 
MoH, Ministry of Local Government (MoLG) and/or LoGs.  
8.4.  Delivery of curative health services under the current system of decentralisation could 
be improved by learning from best practices from relatively better performing districts. In 
Chapter 2, an ideal model of accountability was presented which would deliver medicines to 
people, if well followed. And, among the five sampled districts, Rukungiri stands out to have  
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performed better on all four out of the five cardinal principles of effective service delivery 
including – delegation, performance, information and enforceability. 
8.5.  While NMS controls and manages a meagre proportion of the total drug budget, the 
study findings revealed that it was unable to honour orders from public health facilities. The 
performance  varies  across  health  facility  levels.  For  the  sampled  districts,  nearly  23.5 
percent of credit line budget for Hoima Regional Referral Hospital remained unspent. The 
corresponding figure for Apac Hospital was 41.7 percent, 30.8 percent for Kamuli Hospital 
and 29.1 percent for Mubende Hospital. The findings reveal that the inability to supply 100 
percent was mainly attributed to NMS than at any other level. Poor procurement planning 
and low capacity were singled out as major constraining factors affecting the performance 
of NMS.  
8.6.  A big chuck of the PHC is targeted to district lower health facilities. However, it was 
evident that not all public money meant for medicines are spent as per guidelines and on a 
timely basis. There is variation from district to district with some districts treating guidelines 
as conditionality and others literally ignoring them and doing things their way. For example, 
Hoima had spent only 28 percent of PHC funds meant for medicines compared to 94.5 
percent for Rukungiri. The DHOs office retains a significant amount of these funds. 
8.7.  This study recommends improvement in the collection and use of the HMIS using the 
existing structure. However, a different approach of such an improvement is proposed. It is 
proposed that when health facilities and districts are able to use the information generated 
through the HMIS, they will have an incentive to submit complete information. It will then 
create  an  opportunity  for  the  ministries  of  Health,  Finance  and  Local  Government  to 
conduct appropriate monitoring, not only of medicines and funds but of service delivery. 
Initial districts must be identified to concentrate on and use them as models for other 
districts to learn. 
8.8.  Learning  from  good  practices:  Based  on  the  study  findings  from  the  five  sampled 
districts, performance varies across districts and within district. Rukungiri district seemed to 
out-perform the other four districts on several dimensions. It is recommended that district 
leaders should be encouraged to learn from, and replicate the good practises that exist 
elsewhere within Uganda. NMS should also be encouraged to learn from what JMS does 
better. The same principle applies to government facilities and faith-based health facilities. 
8.9.  Stock out of medicines: Stock outs were more prevalent for medicines procured under 
third party than under the credit line medicines. It was difficult to establish drug stocks out 
under the PHC due to poor record management at various levels. The drug stock outs partly 
contribute to drug misuse by the households. It was evident that where supportive services 
exist such as laboratories etc; and timely delivery of medicines drug misuse was limited. Due 
to poor stock management, it is sometimes difficult to predict stock outs. It is also difficult 
to differentiate whether stock outs incidences are as a result of poor record management or 
actual stock outs. For instance, the stock outs reported in the newspapers are a reflection of 
stock outs in those facilities with up dated stock cards. Those without stock cards and those 
without updated  stock  cards  may have  experienced  stock-out or not but these  are not 
reported – under or over estimating stock outs.  
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8.10.  Standardization and procedures: The need for this cannot be overemphasised. 
First, even the guidelines such as those under the PHC are not fully followed. Second, there 
are  no clear  standardised  formulae/guidelines  for  medicines  quantification  at the  lower 
health  facilities.  It  was  evident  that  participation  of  lower  health  facilities  in  the  drug 
delivery varied across districts with mixed results. Thus, there is need to standardise what is 
expected to happen at district level by MoH. The inadequate stock control measures need 
to be addressed. 
8.11.  Information:  Effective  access  to  information,  including  funding  for  drug, 
accountability  at  all  levels  is  lacking  in  most  cases.  The  lower  health  centres  and,  in 
particular,  the  beneficiaries  should  have  access  to  such  information.  Otherwise,  the 
accountability  relations  in  public  service  delivery  as  presented  in  Chapter  2  would  be 
incomplete.  
8.12.  It  is,  therefore,  proposed  that  the  entire  drug  delivery  mechanism  be 
dramatically  reviewed  with  a  view  to  improving  the  delivery  of  medicines  to  final 
beneficiaries. The following are proposed actions in this regard: 
i.  Except for hospitals (both referral and district hospitals), money for medicines (both 
credit line and PHC) should be transferred directly from MoFPED to NMS, with strong 
inspection by  the MoH, as regards  the  utilisation of the  money.  There are  valid 
concerns  with  this  proposal, which  would  effectively  put the  medicines and the 
money together as was the case during the days of the CMS. However, a strong 
inspection department in the MoH would ensure proper utilization of the money by 
NMS and should this require revision of the NMS Statute, then it should be done. In 
the case of hospitals (both referral and district hospitals) MoFPED should transfer 
money for medicines directly to them on condition that they purchase the medicines 
from either the NMS or JMS. Any money not utilised  for purchase of medicines 
should be returned to the MoFPED at the end of the financial year. The institutional 
framework for the distribution of medicines at the district level i.e. to lower level 
health centres should remain the way it is.   
ii.  Resources need to be invested in strengthening the supervisory capability of MoH, 
with  a  view  to  empowering  the  ministry  to  supervise  and  inspect  all  health 
institutions (including those established by Acts of Parliament) in the country. The 
MoH  should  hold  NMS  managers  personally  accountable  for  what  goes  right  or 
wrong in NMS. Tough measures must be put in place (by MoH and MoFPED) to 
punish  NMS  management  (a)  if  essential  medicines  (like  anti-malarials)  are 
inadequate; (b) if NMS delivers medicines that are not requested by clients; (c) if 
NMS dumps onto lower health facilities drugs that have less than three months’ 
shelf-life;  or  (d)  if  NMS  delays  to  deliver  medicines  on  time.  The  institutional 
frameworks  should  be  reviewed,  where  necessary,  to  empower  the  MoH  to 
undertake supervision and inspection. The aim is to improve efficiency in health 
service delivery. 
iii.  To  overcome the  widespread problem  of drug stock outs,  NMS  should  be  given 
adequate capitalization to enable it procure 100 percent of the drugs requested by 
clients. Once NMS has financial autonomy and adequate capitalization, there should 
be zero tolerance to NMS’s perpetual problem of non-availability of medicines. The  
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NMS must purchase the medicines requested for from the market, including JMS 
and/or other private pharmacies in line with national procurement guidelines.  
iv.  The 50 percent PHC funds meant for medicines at local government level should be 
transferred directly from MoFPED to NMS. In other words, NMS should be given an 
expanded mandate of procuring and distributing all medicines and the distinction 
between “credit line” and “PHC” medicines should stop. This will increase availability 
of medicines in the districts. 
v.  The abuse of drugs by individuals/households, together with the associated problem 
of  rising  resistance  to  medicines,  were  less  serious  problems  where  diagnostic 
facilities existed. Government must invest in laboratories and rapid diagnostic kits 
across the country. These are important and affordable. 
vi.  Evidence shows that high quality auxiliary infrastructure matters. Government, in 
collaboration with its development partners, should invest in staff housing, solar 
power, improved IT and telephone connectivity, quality roads, water and sanitation, 
among others. These  play  a  fundamental  role  in  the  attraction and retention  of 
health workers in any specific locality. Initially government should concentrate its 
efforts in ensuring good health services up to HC III level. As and when resources 
permit, and on a gradual basis, HC IIs could be upgraded to HC IIIs. In the meantime, 
resources flowing to HC IIs could be consolidated at HC III level to improve health 
service delivery at that level.  
vii.  A framework for coordinating donors in the health sector needs to be worked out 
expeditiously to avoid disruption of NMS activities. One way of doing this is by NMS 
creating  a  special  unit  to  handle  medicines  supplies  by  “third  parties”.  A  clear 
procurement  and  distribution  calendar  of  medicines  supplied  by  third  parties  is 
necessary. 
viii.  Operational funds for various levels of health units should be determined a priori 
and transferred from the MoFPED to the MoH and then directly to beneficiary health 
institutions, which include the Office of the DHO, Office of the health sub-district and 
lower level health centres (HC IIs, HC IIIs and HC IVs). At the district level, the district 
health inspection  system  should be  strengthened to  ensure  proper utilization of 
operational funds in lower level health centres. The MoH should not allow health 
centres to pay wages of any category of workers from operational funds; all workers 
should be registered and their wages paid directly by the MoH.  The MoH should 
issue clear guidelines to HUMCs on use of operational funds.      
ix.  At  the  district  level,  the  CAOs  must  ensure  that  medicines  effectively reach the 
beneficiaries. Additionally, the DHO, the HSD medical officer, the in-charges of lower 
level health units and very importantly, the police, ISO and DISO and GISO all have an 
important leadership role to play in inspecting, monitoring or even evaluating the 
availability  of  medicines.  Together,  they  can  ensure  that  medicines  and  medical 
services are available to the people. Then, and only then, the diseases of the poor 
would be overcome. 
x.  The  PHC  funding  is  spread  so  thinly  across  the  lower  health  levels  leading  to 
unintended  inefficiencies.  It  is  proposed  that  government  should  improve  and 
strengthen infrastructure at HC IIIs with the aim of reducing the burden on higher  
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health facilities. This should enable the referral hospitals to focus on their mandate. 
This also calls for revisiting the referral system between HC IIs and HC IIIs. 
xi.  While the intention of the Government’s decentralization strategy in the delivery of 
health services cannot be contested, the process of decentralization seems to have 
been  hurried,  this  resulted  in  inefficiencies  in  the  delivery  of  health  services 
especially at HC II level. Accordingly, more emphasis needs to be put at HC III, VI and 
hospitals as Government rethinks the role of HC IIs in the delivery of health services. 
Government  could  encourage  PPPs  at  the  level  of  the  Parish  (where  HC  II  are 
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Table A 1: PHC releases to facility level, July 2008 to June 2009, Ushs 
Facility level  Estimated  Approved  Releases  %released 
against 
approved 
District hospitals:         
Apac  245,701,000  245,701,000  245,701,000  100.0 
Kamuli  245,702,000  245,702,000  245,702,000  100.0 
Mubende  283,796,000  283,796,000  283,796,000  100.0 
Others  9,993,301,000  9,993,301,000  9,928,339,240  99.3 
Total  10,768,500,000  10,768,500,000  10,703,538,240  99.4 
         
District lower facilities:         
Apac  463,130,620  463,130,620  439,966,162  95.0 
Kamuli  543,989,870  543,989,870  516,780,748  95.0 
Mubende  407,026,970  407,026,970  386,668,559  95.0 
Rukungiri  355,279,170  355,279,170  337,509,119  95.0 
Hoima  375,370,160  375,370,160  356,595,183  95.0 
Others  26,566,303,240  26,566,303,240  25,238,032,149  95.0 
         
Total  28,711,100,030  28,711,100,030  27,275,551,920  95.0 
Source: MoFPED, Budget allocations 





Appendix 1: List of Government facilities visited 
Institutions  Officials interviewed  Period 
National level:     
Ministry of Health  Director General of Health Services; 
Head of Pharmacy division; 
March –May, 2009 
Ministry of Finance, Planning and 
Economic Development 
Commissioner Budgeting,  Officer in-
charge of Health sector, Commissioner 
Public Administration  
 
National Medical Store  General Manager  
Sales and Operations officer  
March –May, 2009 
National Drug Authority  Director and Chief Commercial Officer 
Director Marketing; Head Drug 
Inspectorate 
March –May, 2009 
Joint Medical Store  General Manager 
Sales and Distribution Manager 
April –May , 2009 
Quality Chemical Industries Ltd  Director Marketing; Director Finance  March –May, 2009 
District level:     
Apac  DHO, CAO, CFO, Health Sub-Accountant, 
District Store Keepers, District Assistant 
Drug Inspectors 
4-9 May, 2009 
Hoima  DHO, CAO, CFO, Health Sub-Accountant, 
District Store Keepers, District Assistant 
Drug Inspectors 
15-20 Mar, 2009 
Kamuli  DHO, CAO, DCAO, CFO, MS, Health Sub-
Accountant,  District Store Keepers, 
District Assistant Drug Inspectors 
1-7 Mar, 2009 
Mubende  DHO, CAO, CFO, Health Sub-Accountant, 
District Store Keepers, District Assistant 
Drug Inspectors 
29 March-3 April, 2009 
Rukungiri  DHO, CAO, CFO, Health Sub-Accountant, 
District Store Keepers, District Assistant 
Drug Inspectors 
4-9 May, 2009 
     
District level:     
Rukungiri District  
1.  Kebisoni HC IV 
2.  Ruhinda HC III 
3.  Karangaro HC II 
4.  Bwambara HC III 
5.  Rwenshama HC III 
6.  Bugangari HC IV 
7.  Bugangari HC IV 
8.  Nyarushanje HC III 
9.  Rwerere HC II 
10.  Nyakagyeme HC III 
11.  Rukungiri HC III 







1.  Namwendwa HC(IV) 






March 2009  
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Institutions  Officials interviewed  Period 
3.  Bulopa HC(III) 
4.  Kidera HC- IV 
5.  Bukungu HC-II 
6.  Kasolwe HC-III 
7.  Nankandhulo HC-IV 
8.  Bupandhengo 
9.  Kamuli District Referral 
10.  Kamuli Mission Hospital 
Hoima District 
1.  Kiseke HC II 
2.  Kyabasenja HC II 
3.  Kigorobya HC II 
4.  Kibiru HC II 
5.  Buraru HC III 
6.  Buseruka HC III 
7.  Kikuube HC IV 
8.  Kaseeta HC II 
9.  Sebigoro HC II 
10.  Wambabya HC II 
11.  Kabwoya HC III 
12.  Kyangwali HC III 







Mubende District  
1.  Mubende Hospital 
2.  Nabigoola HC III 
3.  Kabyuma HC II 
4.  Kalonga HC III 
5.  Kiganda HC IV 
6.  Katoloogo HC II 
7.  Madudu HC III-(PNFP) 
8.  Kasambya HC III 










Appendix 2: Survey Instruments Used in data collection 
ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH CENTER (EPRC) 
ORDER FILL RATE TO BE CALCULATED AT ISSUING NATIONAL MEDICAL STORES (NMS)/JOINT MEDICAL STORES (JMS) 
Name of facility placing order                                              level                   district                        day       month             year 


































Batch number  Date of placing 







Date of funds received 
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ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH CENTRE ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR STORE ROOMS DRUG TRACKING 
DISTRICT HOSPITALS AND LOWER-LEVEL ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR SELECTED DISTRICTS IN UGANDA 
SECTION 1: B   Inventory of equipment and supplies available at the district and facilities (central pharmacy stores/main store room) 
Health facility name                                                     District                        Facility code        level         Day         Month        Year 






Credit       1 
PHC          2 
3





























of days of 
stock outs in 










1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14 
Coartem (Yellow)                           
Coartem (blue)                           
Coartem (brown)                           
Coartem (green)                           
Fansidar                           
Quinine tab                           
Quinine Inject                           
Panadol                           
Aspirin                            
Septrin                            
Amoxicillin                           
Flagyl                           
Albendazole                           
Gentayan                           
Aprollixacian                           
Ketocomazole                           
Doxycyline                           
Hydrocartsone                           
Comments: 
Note: For any product that experienced a stock out in the last 6 months (including the day of visit), please note reasons (by product). 
Are stock cards and reports completed using the smallest unit of count?  Y/N. Stock Status (Specify a full six month period prior to the survey; and the day of visit)  
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ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH CENTER (EPRC) PHC AND OTHER FUNDS TRACKING TOOL  
SECTION 3: DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BUDGET ALLOCATIONS AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURE ON DRUGS 
DISTRCTS, HOSPITALS AND LOWER-LEVEL ASSESSMENT TOOL FOR SELECTED DISTRICTS IN UGANDA  
 










Management   ….3 













% Discrepancy  
  Reasons for discrepancy 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9 
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ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH CENTER (EPRC) 
SECTION 4: INTERVIEW OF THE MS/IN-CHARGES OF HOSPITALS/HEALTH FACILITIES 
Health facility                                  Facility code               Day     Month       Year                            
No.  Question  Code Classification  Go To 




Mobile number: ______________ 
 
 
102  Number of years and months you have worked at this 
facility? 
 
Years: ______  Months: ________ 
 
103  OPD attendance per month      
104  If HC IV or Hospital Bed capacity      
105 
Range of services provided  
OPD…………….          1 
Theatre…………..         2 
Maternity ………..         3 
HIV Administration……4 
 
106  Average Length of Stay (for in-patients).     
107  Catchment’s population for the facility.     
108  Total number of staff     
109 
 Number of staff by Cadre.               Doctors ……… 
Nurses…………                                      
Clinical Officer……. 
Midwives…………                   
Pharmacy Technician … 
Pharmacy Assistant ………   
Pharmacist………                   




What are the common diseases among patients who seek 








Who is the principal person responsible for managing 
medical supplies at this facility? 
Nurse                                     1 
Clinical Officer                  2 
Pharmacy Technician   3 
Pharmacy Assistant   4 
Pharmacist                   5 
Medical Assistant                 6 




Is supplies/stock management the primary role of this 
person at this facility? 
Yes  1 
No  0   
113  How is drug supply and procurement done at this facility ?     
114  How is it like managing at this facility ?     
No.  Questions  Code Classification  Go To/  Comments 
201. 
 




A. stock cards/bin card/ inventory control card 
Yes   1 
No   0 
  B. stock ledger  
Yes   1 
No   0 
C. other(specify) 
Yes   1 
No   0 
202. 
What LMIS forms do you use for reporting/ordering? 
A. Local Purchasing Order 
Yes   1 
No   0   
B. Goods Received Notes 
Yes   1 
No   0 
 
C. Goods Delivered Notes  Yes (specify) ___________________________  1 
No   0 
 
203. 
Do LMIS report forms include the following? 
A. stock on hand 
Yes   1 




B. quantities used 
Yes   1 
No  0 
C. losses and adjustments 
Yes   1 
No  0 
204. 
Does a completed LMIS report include the following? (must be verified with completed report) 
A. stock on hand 
Yes   1 
No  0 
Completed report not available  9 
 
B. quantities used 
Yes   1 
No  0 
Completed report not available  9 
 
C. losses and adjustments 
Yes   1 
No  0 
Completed report not available  9 
 
205. 
How often are these LMIS reports sent to the 
higher level?  
(Circle all that apply.) 
Monthly ....................................................... A 
Quarterly   B 
Semi-annually   C 
Annually  ...................................................... D 
Other ________________________________ W 
 
206. 
When was the last time you sent an order/report 
for products at this facility? 
Never   .......................................................... 1 
Within the last month   2 
2 months ago  .............................................. 3 
3 months ago  .............................................. 3 
More than 3 months ago   ............................. 4 
 
207. 
How many facilities are supposed to send LMIS 







How many facilities submitted complete LMIS 
reports for the month of ________  
(two months prior to survey month)? 
_____________ 
 




How did you learn to complete the 
forms/records used at this facility? 
(Circle all that apply.) 
During a logistics workshop  ......................... A 
On-the-job training  ..................................... B 
Never been trainied ..................................... C 
Other (specify) ________________________ W 
 
210. 
How many emergency orders for _______ 
(product of interest, e.g., contraceptives, STI 
drugs, etc.) have you placed in the last 3 
months? 
None ........................................................... 0 
1 .................................................................. 1 
2 .................................................................. 2 
3 .................................................................. 3 
More than 3  4 




Who determines this facility’s resupply 
quantities? 
(Circle all that apply.) 
The facility itself   ......................................... A 
Higher-level facility   .................................... B 
Other  _______________________________ W 
 
212. 
How are the facility’s resupply quantities 
determined? 
Formula (any calculation) _______________  1 
Don’t know  ................................................. 2 
Other means ................................................ 9 
 
213. 
Who is responsible for transporting products to 
your facility? 
(Circle all that apply.) 
Local supplier delivers  ................................. A 
Higher level delivers  .................................... B 
This facility collects  ..................................... D 
Other (specify)  ……………………………………….W 
 
 
214.  What type of transportation is most often used? 
Facility vehicle  ............................................ 1 
Public transportation  .................................. 2 
Private vehicle  ............................................ 3 
Boat............................................................. 4 
Motorcycle  ................................................. 5 
Bicycle  ........................................................ 6 
On foot  ....................................................... 7 
Other (specify) ________________________ 9 
 
215. 
On average, approximately how long does it take 
between ordering and receiving products? 
Less than 2 weeks ........................................ 1 
2 weeks to 1 month  .................................... 2 
Between 1 and 2 months  ............................ 3 
More than 2 months  ................................... 4 
 
216. 
When did you receive your most recent 
supervision visit? 
 
Check visitors book, if necessary. 
Never received ............................................ 1 
Within the last month  ................................. 2 
1 - 3 months ago .......................................... 3 
3 - 6 months ago  ......................................... 4 
More than 6 months ago   ............................. 5 
Other (specify)   9 
 
217. 
Did your last supervision visit include drug 
management (e.g., stock cards checked, reports 
checked, expired stock removed, storage 
conditions checked)? 
Yes   1 
No   0 







ECONOMIC POLICY RESEARCH CENTER (EPRC) 
SECTION 6: EXIT INTERVIEW WITH PATIENTS 
Health facility                                      facility code              Day        Month       Year 
No   Question   Code classification   Go to/comment  
601  Age in complete years      
602  Gender   Male ……..1 
Female …..2 
 
603  Highest level of education   None …………  0 
Primary …….  1 
Secondary …. 2 
Tertiary ………3 
 




605  Have you received a prescription from this facility for your 










607  Have you received all the prescribed drugs?  Yes ………….1 
No …………..0 
              610 
             608 
608  What did the health care worker tell you about the drugs you 
have not received? 
To buy……….1 
No drugs ……2 
Nothing ………3 
 
609  What are you going to do about them?  
 




610  Did you pay for the drugs you received?  Yes …………1 
No …………..0 
              611 
                612 
611  How much did you pay for the drugs?     
612  What problems did you face in obtaining the medications? 
 
No dispenser …….1 
Waiting for so long…2  
Other (specify)……3 
 
613  Is this your first time to use this health facility?   Yes …………1 
No …………..0 
             615 
            614 




615  For the times you have used this health facility, have you been 




616  Which drugs are usually unavailable?     
617  Is there a place in the community where you can buy such 
medications? 
Yes ………..1 
No  …………0 
 





619  What do you have to say about drug availability in this health 
facility?  
   
 
End the interview and thank the respondent 
 